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Introduction
Economic  growth  is determined  by how well  a country  mobilizes  its
resources  in order to increase the  production  of goods and services. Gen-
erally,  resources include  labor and human skills,  capital,  land,  and natu-
ral  resources.
There  are two  approaches  to economic growth  (Choi 1983). One ap-
proach  is  to increase  the  utilization  or the  amount  of  factor  inputs  or
resources  for production.  For example,  output  from  agriculture  can be
expanded  by increasing  the  utilization  of available  arable  land  that  had
been previously  considered  idle  for farming.  One drawback  to this  ap-
proach  is  that  if  one keeps  on increasing  the  amount  of the  same fac-
tor  inputs  into  the  production  process, the  increase  in the  level  of out-
put  that  can be generated  will  eventually  be subject to  diminishing  re-
turns.  Stated  graphically  in  a  production  function,  output  increases
rapidly  at  the  initial  stage  (around  point  a  in  Figure  1). However,  if
one keeps on adding  the  amount  of the  same factor  input,  the  increase
in  output  that  may be generated  may  not be as much as in the  initial
stage  (movement  toward  point  b along production  function  1).
Krugman  (1995),  in a highly  controversial  paper titled  "The  Myth  of
Asia's  Miracles,"  argues  that  Singapore's  rapid  growth  was due to capi-
tal  accumulation,  and certainly  not a "miracle."  Its  growth  path is simi-
lar  to the  capital  accumulation  type  of growth  of the  Soviet  Union  that
first  experienced  rapid  growth  during  the  1950s and then suffered  a sig-
nificant  economic slowdown once it reached its  limits.  "Economic  growth
that  is based on expansion  of inputs,  rather  than  on the  growth  of out-
put  per unit  of input,  is inevitably  subject to diminishing  returns."
This  leads to the  second approach  that  deals  with  improved  produc-
tivity  through a more efficient utilization  of the same amount of inputs. Stated
graphically,  this  means an outward  shift  in the production function  (from 1
to 2 in Figure  1). Thus in this  shifted  production function,  for every level of
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factor input, there is a corresponding  higher level of output, indicating a higher
productivity  of output per unit of input (from point a to point c, and from point
b to d). The productivity  improvement could largely be due to the introduc-
tion of the process of technological innovation in production. As we shall dis-
cuss below, this  process of technological innovation could involve a range of
activities.  For example, it could involve the utilization  of better machinery,
better production  management  and methods,  and the application  of best  practices,
among  others. It could take place in factories or in offices.
It is important  to note at this juncture  that technological innovation and
economic  growth are mutually  reinforcing (Hirono 1985). That is, higher rate
of growth would tend to generate productivity  improvement through technol-
ogy innovation, and vice versa.  This is especially  true when there are increasing
returns  to scale. In  such cases,  the outward  shift  of the production function
would have no boundaries, implying that there would be no limits  to growth.
Historically,  the whole idea of technology  affecting economic  growth dates
back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when scientific principles,
which were accumulated since the start  of modern science in the  sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, were turned into technologies  and applied to pro-
duction during the  industrial  revolutft>n in western Europe. The steam en-
gine, for example, which triggered the industrial  revolution,  was the result
of the accumulation of knowledge through scientific discoveries and the ap-
plication to production.
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However, the relationships between technological  innovation and economic
growth were made evident by the remarkable experiences  of Japan after World
War II and South Korea in:  the 1960s or after the Korean War. Through tech-
nological development policies that  started to turn  the wheel of technologi-
cal innovation,  these countries were able to achieve rapid  economic growth
in a sustained manner. In a significantly  shorter period of time compared to
the development in western Europe, these countries were able to transform
their economies  from being almost completely devastated right  after the war
to being highly advanced industrial  economies  at present.
Figure  2 shows the process of technological innovation  that is being re-
ferred to. This process  was conceptualized by Yamada (1964) and later cited
by Choi (1983). It is shown here to emphasize the point that  it is a dynamic
process  of progressive technological advances  and economic  growth, each  one
reinforcing  the other. The process continues in a sustained manner, and in
each  round growth improves.
Generally,  technological innovation involves two major parts-research
and innovation.  The innovation  part has two phases. In the  first  part,  the
introduction  of new technology leads to new products and reduces the cost
of production. These new products have better quality  than before. Because
of the  reduction  in cost per unit,  for the same total  cost of production,  the
quantity of output that could be produced  would increase. Better-quality prod-
ucts and greater volume of production result in mass production that attracts
entrepreneurs to increase their  marketing  effort and further  reduces cost  be-
cause of economies of scale. Mass production and lower cost could result  in
mass consumption. This  whole  set of activities  could lead to improved in-
come for the  general public,  which in turn.  could lead to change~ in taste,
thus  creating  higher demand for more quality  products. This impulse trig-
gers off pressure to improve the  existing technology. Thus, the entire  pro-
cess  repeats itself  continually  toward economic  prosperity.
The performance of Japan and South Korea is indeed outstanding.  They
have been able to close their  technological gap with  highly advanced indus-
trial  countries  in so short a time.  From the perspective of developing coun-
tries, the question to ask is: Can this fast- catching up process generally hold
for the rest of technologically backward developing countries?
There are two schools of thought on this issue that  ought to be reviewed
briefly because of their implications  to the Philippines  case.Technological  Innovation in Japan and  S&T Experiences  in the  Philippines
Figure  2.  Technological  Innovation  Process
Source: Quoted  from Choi (1983);  original  source  is Yamada  (1964)
The  first  school,!  which started  with  Gerschenkron's (1962) discussion
of the advantages of backwardness,  deals with the issue of convergence  (Barro
and Sala-i-Martin  1995). The convergence school states that  technologically
backward countries  benefit from the  technology created by advanced coun-
tries.  One of the strongest postulates of this  school categorically states that
the "catch-up growth is proportional  to the difference in technological capa-
bilities between  a follower and the leaders.  This predicts an inverse relationship
between technological capabilities  at any point in time and subsequent pro-
ductivity  (as well as economic)  growth"  (Evenson  and Westphal 1995).
Through technology transfer,  backward countries can catch up with  ad-
vanced  nations. With appropriate policies and investments on education,  physi-
cal capital,  general management capability,  and research and development
(R&D), backward countries can learn the technology developed in advanced
nations. Alongside these developments is a convergence of income and pro-
dtlctivity  levels.
The  paper  of  Evenson  and  Westphal  (1995)  provides  a good  survey  of  literature  on  this  issue.
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The other school  argues that the process  may not be that easy  and straight-
forward. Although  newly industrialized  countries (NICS)2  have grown rapidly
in recent times and have in fact converged  to the leading countries in terms of-
income and productivity,  most developing countries are not on a similar  path
of convergence  toward advanced  nations. In fact, there  is a divergence  (Williamson
1991). A whole range of factors may be responsible for the divergence and the
widening gap between most developing  countries and advanced  nations. These
factors can include adverse institutions  and deficient policy regimes. Among
others, Choi (1983)  points to the vicious circle of poverty in which mostdevel-
oping countries are trapped. He cites other factors:
1.  Developing countries are weak in policy formulation  for scientific and
technological development. In these countries, public interest  in sci-
ence and development is low. Their  traditional  cultures  are hostile
and can pose hindrances to the creation of viable science  policy.
2.  Viable institutional  setups  are lacking and R&D systems  are inadequate
in these countries. Often, research  equipment are inadequate, research
budgets are nil, and research  budget allocation is extremely inefficient.
3.  There is very limited  scientific  manpower in these countries.
4.  Most of these countries rely heavily on imported technology.  Still, there
are no clear-cut policies and programs to develop domestic capabil-
ity to modify and improve imported technologies  for local applications.
There are no policies to address technological dependence.
5.  Also lacking  in these economies  is the participation  of relevant  sec-
tors in the development  of science  and technology (S&T), particularly
in the  industrial  sector to  which  most of the  applied  research and
development efforts are directed.
Still  another point that has bearing on the discussion  of the Philippine case
relates to industrial  strategy and the role of government. The issue is relevant
in the present context for the following reasons: (a) couatries which have per-
formed remarkably well like Japan3 and South Korea have applied industrial
strategy that largely centered on technological  development  and with extremely
strong government leadership; and (b) industrial  strategy with  strong govern-
ment intervention seems  inappropriate in a "globalized" world market.4~
2  Generally  known  to include  South Korea,  Hong Kong,  Singapore,  and  Taiwan.
3  Whose  experience  the paper  will heavily  draw policy  lessons  from for the Philippines.
.The ongoing  economic  reforms  in the Philippines  are largely  premised  on a free-trade  world  environment.
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There are two schools  of thought that are worthy of review.5 One is based
on the argument of the neoclassical  school, which centers on neutral  govern-
ment policy, while  the other is based on industrial  strategists'  idea of selec-
tive  intervention  by government to manage technological change aimed to
achieve a dynamically  efficient industrialization.
According to the  neoclassical school, the role of the  government is sim-
ply to provide  an economic environment  in which market forces will  realize
the  efficient  allocation  of resources. If there  are mark;et failures,  then the
appropriate policy instruments are prices and price-denominated policies (e.g.,
taxes and subsidies), which have to be applied fairly. If institutions  are lacking,
then the government's proper role is only to facilitate  the  establishment  of
such institutions  that should function as market agents. If social overheads
are too large and expensive for the private  sector to undertake,  then the gov-
ernment can assist, without  necessarily promoting specific industrial  activi-
ties. The neoclassical advocates support human capital formation,  but only
in ways that do not discriminate  against other activities.
According to the other school, "market forces alone are not responsible for
the purported market success  of economies  like Japan and Korea. Neutral policy
regime is not a necessary  condition for successful  industrialization"  (pack and
Westphal 1986).  Furthermore, this school  states that neutral policy regime may
not be a generally sufficient condition for rapid industrialization  that is based
on technological change. This is because acquisition of technological capabil-
ity happens neither automatically  nor without cost. The key elements of tech-
nology are often imperfectly traded, or worse, in a great number of cases, not
at all.  As we have discussed above,  there are many institutional  bottlenecks
other than  poverty that  may hinder the growth of science  and technology in
these  countries. All these  factors provide stumbling blocks to the growth of these
countries, especially in terms of technological  development.
This  paper will  adempt to look into the technological innovation  experi-
ence of Japan during the early period of its rapid economic  growth after World
War II.  Among the main issues that it will  address are the initial  conditions,
the economic environment  in which the economy  was operating at the time,
the goals and strategies pursued, economic  policies implemented, programs
developed, and the role of government. The paper will  then try  to contrast
this  experience with  that  of the Philippines  and will  attempt to draw policy
lessons for the country in the light  of th~ issues raised above.
5  The paper of Pack  and Westphal  (1986),  which this part heavily  draws  from, provides  a good review  on this issue.
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Patterns  of  Technological  Innovations  in  Japan
Initial  Conditions
Before the war. Years before World War II broke out, Japan had already
embarked on an industrial  development program. In fact, heavy and chemi-
cal industries  already made remarkable  growth in the 1920s. By the begin-
ning  of the  1930s, these industries  were  at the  verge of a rapid  take-off
(Takafusa  1994). The textile  industry  grew rapidly,  as well as heavy indus-
tries  such as steel. Another standout industry was rayon production, the pro-
duction technology for which was perfected in the 1930s. In machinery, Ja-
pan became  almost completely  self-sufficient, except  for special  high-end items.
This formed the basis for the development  of military  supply industries. During
this period, exports grew rapidly also.
These developments since the 1920s  allowed the Japanese to accumulate
valuable experience in economic  growth and technological  development, which
proved to be one of the  major  driving  forces of the rapid  economic growth
after the war.
Industrial  policies during the period such as government subsidies gave
birth  to a number of new industries  and big corporations. These industries
included electric  power, electric  smelting of aluminum,  electronics, and au-
tomobile industries,  to name a few. In fact, the origins of some of the present-
day big corporations  in Japan (e.g., Toyota, Toshiba, NEC, Nippon, Nissan,
etc.) can be traced back to this period.
A number of important economic  laws were passed  and implemented during
this  period as well.  Among the  important  ones that  started  Japan's march
toward  industrialization  were the Oil Industry  Law of 1934,  the Automotive
Industry  Law of 1936, the Artificial  Oil Industry  Law and the  Steel Indus-
try  Law of 1937, and the Machine Tools Industry  Law and the Aircraft  Manu-
facturing  Industry  Law of 1938.
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A number of key economic institutions  were established during  the pe-
riod. For example, the Cabinet Planning Board was organized in 1927. Origi-
nally,  it consisted of the Planning Agency and the Resource  Bureau. In  1937
the Planning  Agency was reorganized and tasked to implement a Five- Year
Plan for Key Industries.  In  1956  the Science  and Technology Agency was es-
tablished.  During  this  period, the  Council for Science and Technology was
also created to  act as the  policymaking  body on science and technology at
the national level. Furthermore,  many national as well as industry-sponsored
research institutions  were founded. For example, the Tokyo Industrial  Test-
ing Laboratory and Institute  of Physical and Chemical Research already ex-
isted then and were closely linked  with industries.
Foundations of the postwar economy.  World War II  brought tremendous
damage to Japan, which lost about one-fourth of its physical assets (Takafusa
1994). Table 1 shows some estimates of the  extent of the damage. Despite
this  massive devastation, Japan was able to build  up its production capacity
by producing armaments. Heavy industries and chemical industries increased
their  plant and equipment for the production of military  supplies.
According to Takafusa  (1994) much of these production capacities were
spared during the war.  For example, steel production capacity that stood at
3 million  tons in  1937 increased to 6.6 million  tons during  the  peak of the
war. After the war, Japan was left with a substantial  capacity of 5.6 million
tons. Similarly,  copper refining,  lead, and aluminum,  which  saw major ca-
pacity expansion during the war, were left with huge production capacity af-
Table  1. Destruction  of  National  Wealth  in Japan  (billion  yen)
! 
National  wealth in
1935  calculated  at






Gross  value  of  national  assets
Buildings  and  other  structures
Industrial  machinery
Ships
Electricity  and  gas  supply  facilities
and  equipment




Source:  Quoted  from Takafusa  (1994).  Original  source:  Economic  Stabilization  Board,  Taiheiyo  Senso  ni Yoru
Wagakuni  no Higai Sogo  Hokokusho  (Comprehensive  Report  on Damage  to Our Country  in the Pacific War),
1949
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ter the war. Machine  tool production capacity, which stood at 22,000 units
in 1937,  increased to 60,000  units at the height of the war, and declined slightly
to 54,000 units  after the war. Thus, although Japan experienced substantial
damage as a result  of the war,  it did  not go back to square one right  after
the war, what with  greater expertise, enhanced skills,  and some production
capacities  intact. "The fact that the plant arid equipment of heavy and chemical
industries  survived the war, as did their  technical specialists and laborers,
provided the necessary  conditions for the postwar economic  recovery that was
centered on these industries.  This is one important  legacy," says Takafusa
(1994).
Another  important  legacy of the war cited by Takafusa was the organi-
zational structure  of industry.  Before the war Japan practiced subcontract-
ing in the field  of machinery, aircraft,  and automobile production. The prac-
tice continued after the war, particularly  among big firms. Usually,  big firms
do the assembly, while  subcontracting firms make the materials  and compo-
nents. The subcontracting system  serves  as an important mechanism  for trans-
ferring  and  diffusing  technology, especially from bigger principal  firms  to
smaller  sub-contractor firms.  In Japan 65 percent of small and medium en-
terprises  (SMEs) produce under subcontracting arrangements.  Eighty-two
percent of them are found in the  machinery and textile  sectors. In  1981 81
percent of SMEs were in the transportation  machinery sector, 88 percent of
which specialized in subcontracting. In Japan subcontracting is extensive be-
cause there is less vertical  integration  (Nagaoka 1989). As a major feature
or Japan's economic development, subcontracting has enabled the machin-
ery sector to enjoy international  competitiveness.
Subcontracting arrangements usually involve  implicit  contracts requir-
ing technical guidance, labor supply, leasing of equipment, and risk  sharing
by a principal firm. Also, the system  provides strong incentives and pressures
for subcontractors to innovate. Typically, the principal  firm is responsible for
developing designs and specifications, and provides the  necessary technical
assistance to the subcontractors, who undertake the production according to
the principal's requirements. This kind of arrangement is possible  because  sub-
contractors have high technical capabilities just like the principal firms.
During the war Japan began to develop financial expertise by setting up
financial  institutions  to serve the munitions  companies. It was also during
this period that Japan became internationally  known for its "administrative
guidance." Generally, the government had the power to instruct  business on
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various issues, directly  or indirectly.  For example, during the war the Bank
of Japan exerted strong control over private banks.
Labor unions existed, but were dismantled during the war. However, their
rebirth  after the  war helped improve the welfare of the  labor sector, which
in  turn  established  a generally productive  relationship  between labor and
management. Also, the social security systems (which covered health, insur-
ance, and pension) that  evolved during  those years and which  greatly ben-
efited the laborers lent the necessary stability  to the labor sector. Takafusa
(1994) claims  that  these social security systems constituted  one of the cor-
nerstones of the postwar economic development in Japan.
All  told,  even before World  War II brok~ out, the key ingredients  for an
industrial  take-off were already present in Japan. Technological experience
started to accumulate. Concerns for planning and for identifying  key indus-
tries became major policy issues. Some key institutions  were established. The
government as an institution  was very strong in managing the development
process.  Even during and right after the war, the industrial base  of the economy
expanded. Although  the  war brought a l{)t of damage, it  left behind  certain
important  legacies that  later became key factors  during  the  reconstruction
period and the rapid economic growth era in the 1960s  and 1970s.
Conditions  for Rapid Growth
Table  2 shows  how  Japan  sailed  through  the  rapid  economic  growth  af-
ter  the  war.  For  15 years  starting  1955, Japan's  economy  grew  annually  by
10.3 percent,  more  than  twice  the  annual  average  growth  of  4.4  percent  of
the  rest  of OECD  (Organisation  for Economic  Co-operation  and  Development)
countries  over the  same period.  Even during  the second half  of the  1970s when
the  world  economic  enviropment  Was severely  affected  by the  second  oil  cri-
sis,  Japan  stood  out as the  fastest-growing  industrial  economy.
Improvement  in  productivity  played  a major  role  in the  rapid  growth  of
Japan  after  the  war.  Evidences  of total  factor  productivity  (TFP),  computed
using  the  growth  accounting  method,  indicate  that  more  than  50 percent  of
Japan's  economic  growth  in  the  1950s and  1960s  can be attributed  to  TFP
growth  and  more  than  20 percent  to  improvement  in  technical  knowledge.
Table  3 indicates  that  the  contribution  of productivity  to Japan's  growth  during
this  period  was a lot  higher  than  those of the  United  States,  the  former  West
Germany,  France  and  the  United  Kingdom.
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Table  2. Average  Annual Growth Rates  (%)  of Real  GNP  of Six  Major  Industrial Countries
Another major factor that contributed to Japan's postwar growth was the
high rate of capital formation  that was propped up by the continuous acqui.
sition and development of technology. As will  be discussed below, this  high
rate of capital  formation  came about because of the Japanese people's high
propensity to save.
A number of factors were behind the extraordinarily  high economic  growth
in Japan. Hirono  (1980) singles out five of them, namely: (a) abundant sup-
ply of well-educated  and well-disciplined  labor force; (b) high  level of sav-
ings propensity among  the households;  (c)  competitive spirit  of major economic
actors: (d) high-growth  economic  policies of the government under continued
political  stability;  and (e) favorable international  economic  environment.
Labor force.  Mter  the war school  attendance at all levels improved rap-
idly,  thus  expanding significantly  the  supply of better educated workforce.
According to Hirono  (1980) in 1945 nearly  100 percent of children  between 6
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and 12 years old were enrolled in primary  schools. Among those between 13
and 17  years old, 28 percent of them were in secondary  schools  and 5 percent
in the tertiary  levels. In  1960  those percentages  improved to  100 percent, 74
percent, and 10 percent, respectively. In 1975  enrollment in the secondary  and
tertiary  levels rose further to 92 percent and 24 percent, respectively.
Aside from being better educated, Japanese workers were highly  disci-
plined,  industrious,  and loyal to their  employers. These traits  lent stability
to the workplace. The stability  prevailed as labor unions became  stronger and
labor relations improved. An institutional  foundation for industrial  relations
was set up by the government through the passage  of three pieces of legisla-
tion that provided the legislative framework for labor issues:  the Labor Union
Law, the Labor Standards Law, and the Labor Relations Adjustment Law.
Three basic features of employment in Japan brought  about substantial
improvement  to the welfare  of its labor: age-based seniority  in wages, life-
long employment, and enterprise-based  unions. Enterprise-based unions were
organized  at the firm  or factory level and comprised blue-collar and white-
collar, as well as skilled  and unskilled,  labor. Enterprise  unions and lifetime
employment  reinforced the solidarity and loyalty of employees  to the employers.
For example, employees themselves would  try  to prevent labor strikes  and
work stoppages. During  labor disputes, labor, together with  the employers,
would try hard to settle the disputes at once. These major factors stabilized
Japanese  industrial  relations and merited the envy of other countries (Takafusa
1994).  ~
High  savings propensity. At the time  when personal income was still  at
low levels, the  traditional  concept of savings as a virtue  of life  resulted  in
high rates of savings among households (Hirono  1980). Household savings
were channeled to the banking and life insurance institutions,  which in turn
financed projects both in the private  and public sectors. Gross capital forma-
tion increased dramatically  as a result,  increasing productive  capacity and
economic infrastructure.  Table 4 below shows how savings and capital  im-
proved after the war. From a savings propensity of 0.09 in 1955, it improved
to 0.23 in 1977. Likewise,  from an investment rate of 26.2 percent in 1955, it
peaked to  35;8 percent in  1972, but declined marginally  to 31.2 percent in
1977.
Competitive spirit.  One of the major reforms enforced by the Americans
during  their  six and a half years of occupation of Japan after the  war was
the promotion of democratic forces to develop organizations  in labor, indus-~tterns  of~chnologicallnnovations in Japan
try,  and agriculture.  A major part  of this  process  was the liquidation  of the
zaibatsu and the dissolution of the large industrial  and banking institutions.
The four major zaibatsu-Mitsui,  Mitsubishi,  Sumitomo, and Yasuda-were
dismantled  and restructured.  For example, the  holding  company of Mitsui
that  held the stocks of its  subsidiaries was dissolved while  the stocks held
by the parent company were transferred  to the subsidiaries. The same thing
happened to the other three and the smaller zaibatsu.
Consistent with this reform was the enactment of the Anti-Monopoly Law
in 1947. It  prohibited  the formation  of trust,  all  cartel activities,  joining  of
international  cartels, crossholding of directorships, and even stockholding by
corporations (Takafusa 1994). However, in 1949 the bans on participation  in
international  cartels and corporate stockholding were lifted because  they were
believed to hinder the flow of foreign investment into Japan.
The Anti-Monopoly  Law was followed by the introduction  of a policy de-
signed to eliminate the excessive  concentration of economic  power in the hands
of a few companies. Table 5 shows the impact of this  policy on industry  con-
centration  ratios.  Except for food processing, concentration ratios  of indus-
tries  went down, indicating  the entry of more firms.
Competition  policy is  relevant  in  technological development because it
increases the pace of technological changes in production methods and pro-
cesses,  product development, raw material use, factor substitution,  and man-
agement know-how. Furthermore,  competition puts pressure on cost reduc-
tion and improvement  in factor productivity,  particularly  labor productivity
that  can be shared by labor itself as well as by all stakeholders. However, in
Source:  Hirono,  1980.
Notes:  (1) savings  propensity  for worker  household;  (2) gross  capital  formation  as percent  of gross national
expenditure  computed  using  1975  prices
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Table  5.  Trends  in Concentration  Ratios  for the  Top  Ten  Firms  in the  Manufacturing  Sector
of Japan,  by Industry  Groups*
Source:  Hirono  (1980).  Original  sources:  Fair Trade  Commission,  Nihon  no Sangyo  Shuchu  (Concentration  in
Japanese  Industries),  1963-66  and  1979
'Note:  43 industries  are  selected  for the  five  industry  groups;  11  for  the  food  processing,  six  for the  textiles;  pulp  and
paper;  15  for chemicals,  petroleum,  and  ceramics;  eight  for he metals  and  metal  products;  and  three  for machinery
groups.  The  concentration  ratios  are  computed  on  the  basis  of  output  rather  than  sales,  assets  or  employees
the case of Japan, while the goal was to maintain  competition within  indus-
try,  government competition policies, which used to be very rigid  in the 1940s
and 1950s on cartel arrangements, changed through time  in response to the
changing structure  and requirements  of industries.  Government competition
policies in particular  allowed differences in factor intensity  across industries
and took into consideration pressures from foreign competition brought about
by its  export orientation.  By the  very nature  of the  production  process in-
volved in iron and steel and other heavy and chemical industries,  which were
capital-intensive,  and  given the risks  involved  in the  introduction  of new
technologies into these industries,  some degree of cartel arrangements was
eventually  allowed with  government support, particularly  during  economic
downswings. Also, mergers were permitted,  especially  those which took place
in iron and steel, automotive, ship building, and bank industries, to strengthen
their  competitiveness  in the international  markets.  However, according to
Hirono  (1980), in spite  of these changes in  government  competition  poli-
cies, a consistent  improvement  in  labor productivity  was observed during
the period. He says: "While  the  Fair Trade  Commission has been continu-
ously active  in  implementing  the  anti-monopoly  legislation  ever since its
founding,  it is not an unfair  statement  that  the government's  competition
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policy has undergone some significant  modifications  during  the  last thirty
years. Whether the changes observed in government competition policy have
reduced effective  competition  in Japanese industries  or not is  certainly  a
matter  requiring  serious study.  One thing,  however, is true-that  in spite
of such changes in the  government's  competition  policy there  has been a
consistent rise in the  level of labor productivity  in the Japanese industry."
This shows that the objective of increasing labor productivity  was achieved
even though cartel arrangements, mergers, and the like were re-introduced
into  the  system. This  may be partly  due to the government's  strong pres-
ence or guidance in the system.
Growth policies. A more detailed  treatment  of economic growth policies
in Japan is provided  in the  section on government policies. However, gen-
erally,  it  was widely  observed that  implemented  policies were formulated
to achieve  several objectives.  One of these was to restore  the Japanese  economy
to prewar economic growth  level right  after the war and to double the na-
tional  income. In the National  Income-Doubling Plan, for example, the gov-
ernment  sought to double either the real gross national  expenditure  or the
real gross national  product  within  the decade (Takafusa  1994). According
to Hirono (1980) "all the monetary, fiscal and specific policy measures  available
to the government were mobilized to increase the national output. The other
objectives were to modernize production  facilities;  expand exports; enable
foreign exchange earnings to ensure a continued  supply of energy and raw
materials  required  for expanded production  at home; facilitate  the  inflow
of advanced foreign technology  and management  know-how; improve the level
of domestic absorptive  capacity towards  an effective  utilization  and devel-
opment of new scientific  knowledge and technologies; expand and improve
the economic  and social infrastructure,  including transport, communications.!
and power network to reduce the cost  of production and distribution  per unit
of output  and throughput;  and enable banking and other financial  institu-
tions  to  assist manufacturing  and other corporations to expand capital  in-
vestment."  All  these, together with the nationwide  consensus  to build  a na-
tional wealth, resulted in the growth miracle during the postwar period.
Favorable international  environment. The international  climate  during
the period was highly favorable. Between 1950 and 1965, the world economic
growth was impressively high,  moving at an unprecedented average growth
0[5  percent under the  Bretton  Woods system and the  General Agreement
on Tariffs  and Trade  (GATT) institution.  Table  6 shows the  growth  of ex-
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ports  of Japan and .the other six OECD countries  during  the period. These
countries  enjoyed high rates  of growth  in exports, resulting  in substantial
increases in the  export share vis-a.-vis their  respective  gross national  ex-
penditures.
This favorable  internati()nal  environment  contributed  to the  steady ex-
port  growth  of Japan. Also, as the world  economic progressed, the  supply
of materials  became abundant,  which  allowed  Japan to increase imports
of its  raw  material  requirements.  During  this  period,  Japan enjoyed fa-
vorable  terms  of trade  as export prices were high  and prices  of crude  oil
and other  raw materials  were on the  declining  trend.  In terms  of volume
of major export items  of Japan, Table 7 indicates  substantial  improvement
in  chemical products,  metal and metal products,  and machinery.  Inciden-
tally,  these were the  industry  focus in the  early  postwar  growth  strategy
of Japan,  in which both production and technological capabilities  substan-
tially  improved.
In the  financial  sector, Table 8 shows substantial  amounts  of foreign
capital.that  flowed  into  Japan to help domestic savings finance  huge in-
vestment requirements.  These inflows  consisted of direct investment,  port-
folio investment, bank loans, and bonds. From US$3.2 million  in 1950  capital
inflow  increased substantially  to almost US$6 billion  in 1977.
Patterns  of Growth
Behind this  rapid economic growth in Japan after the war was the mas-
sive transformation of its economic  structure. One clear indication of the trans-
Table  6. Average  Annual  Growth  of Exports  and Exports  as Percent  of GNE  of Six  Major
Industrial  Countries1
Average  Annual  Growth  Rate Exports  as Percent  of  GNE























































Source: Hirono  (1980),  Original  source: United  Nations,  UN Yearbook  of Statistics,  1977  and IBRD, World  Development
Report, 1978
IGrowth rates of exports are in real terms, whereas exports as  percent of GNE (gross national expenditure)  are
calculated  on the basis of current  market  prices.
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Source: Hirono  (1980). Original  source: Bureau  of Customs,  Ministry  of Finance,  Foreign  Trade  Statistics,  1979
Source:  Hirono  (1980),  Original  Source:  MOF,  Monthly  Report  on Financial  Statistics,  in EPA,  Summary,  1969
and  1979
10n  approval  basis
formation  was the movement of labor across sectors. Table 9a and Figure  3
show how labor in Japan had moved sectorally since the war. In 1948 farm-
ers accounted for almost 46 percent of the  total  employment. The self-em-
ployed accounted for  17 percent, while  employees accounted for 37 percent
of the total employment. In 1963 the share of farmers  went down to just  26
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Table  9a.  Labor  Movement  in Japan
Percentage  Distribution  (%) (10,000)












































































Source: Takafusa,  1994. Original  Source: labor Force  Survey
Note: Farmers  -self-employed operators  of farms  or forestry  businesses  and family-member  employees
Self-employed  -self-employed operators  on nonfarming  or forestry  businesses  and family-member  employees
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percent. While  the self-employed more or less retained  their  share, employ-
ees increased their  share to almost 56 percent. In  1983  the share of farmers
dropped to just 8 percent. The share of the self-employed  did not change  much,
but the share of employees shot up to almost 74 percent.
In terms of labor movement across major sectors,  there was a clear move-
ment to the secondary sector (particularly  manufacturing) and to the tertiary
sector  (particularly,  wholesale and retail trade sector).  The employment share
of the  secondary sector improved from 23.5 percent in  1955 to 35.2 percent
in  1977 (Table 9b). Over the same period, the share of manufacturing  em-
ployment increased from  17.6 percent to 25.9 percent.  On the  other hand,
employment in the tertiary  sector (or the services sector)  improved from 35.5
percent in 1955 to 53.3 percent in 1977.
The labor movement away from the farms did not adversely affect the pro-
duction output of agriculture.  In fact, the introduction of technology into agri-
culture and the successful  land reform program of the government contributed
substantially  to the  improvement of agricultural  production. This was espe-
cially true in the northern part of Japan in terms of rice production. Takafusa
(1994)  cites the case  of Tohoku region. During the prewar days, the region was
producing only 30 kilos  per hectare. Mter  the introduction  of better agricul-
tural technology, its production improved to 45 to 60 kilos per hectare.
Through time  productivity  improved significantly.  Table 10 shows that
the man-hours  spent on rice production declined significantly  from 196 per
10 acres in  1952 to  75 in  1977. The yield, however, improved  considerably
from 325 kilogram  per 10 acres to 455 over the same period. The factors be-
hind  this  improved rice productivity  included the  (1) breeding of improved
strains  of rice;  (2) increased fertilizer  production;  (3) rational  application of
fertilizer;  (4) spread of new agricultural  chemicals; and (5) development of
technology for early planting  (White Papers of Japan 1979-1980).
A closer look at the pattern  of manufacturing  growth in Japan is essen-
tial  in understanding  the dynamics of the industrialization  process, as well
as the technological development, during the postwar period. Through an in-
dustrial  policy the development process  focused initially  on a few key indus-




























































































































































































































































































































3Patterns of Technological Innovations  in Japan
Right after the war, policies focused  on resurrecting and rationalizing  four
key manufacturing  industries:  electric power, steel, marine, transportation,
and coal (Takafusa 1994). Meanwhile, the period witnessed the implementa- ,
tion of a policy to substitute  coal for petroleum as the major source of energy
during the mid-1950s (Hirono 1980). This substitution  gave birth  to the pet-
rochemical industry,  which, incidentally,  provided a window  of opportunity
for many advanced technologies developed  abroad to enter Japan. These tech-
nologies diffused to other related industries  and created the favorable ripple
effects. In fact, the rapid pace of plant and equipment investment in the iron,
steel, and petrochemical manufacturing industries  during the 1960s  changed
tremendously the manufacturing  landscape (Hirono 1980).
It is worth noting at this  point that the increasing shares of machinery,
electrical,  and transportation  equipment,  and iron  and metal  products  in
production  from  1955 to  1977 were indicative  of the policy focus during  the
period. Machinery,  electrical,  and transportation  equipment improved  their
collective  share  in the  total  manufacturing  production  from  20 percent  in
1955 to almost 40 percent in 1977, while  the share of iron and metal prod-
ucts rose from 12 percent to 14 percent (Table 11). As a result of the growth
of the  manufacturing  sector, the  structure  of the  overall  economy under-
went substantial  changes during  the period. The share of the  primary  sec-
tor  went  down from  18.5 percent in  1995 to just  4.9 percent  in 1977. The
secondary sector's share increased from 34.7 percent in  1955 to 42.9 per-
cent in  1970 (Table 12). However, brought  about by the recessionary effects
in the  mid.1970s,  the share of the  manufacturing  sector dropped in  1975,
only to recover later  on. Meanwhile,  the share of the tertiary  sector contin-
ued to surge during the period.
Favorable international  environment and improved productivity  in heavy
and chemical industries  as a result  of government's focus on these indus-
tries increased the international  competitiveness of Japanese products, thus
improving  the country's  export performance considerably.  During  this  pe-
riod  changes in the  structure  of exports  took place. In  1955 exports  from
heavy and chemical industries  accounted for 38 percent, while  exports from
light  industries  accounted for 52 percent (Table  13). In  a span of two  de-
cades,  the structure changed  dramatically, with exports from heavy and chemi-
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Source: Hirono,  1980. Original  source: MITI, Tasusho  Hakusho  (White Paper  on International  Trade)  in BS/OPM,  Japan
Statistical  Yearbook,  1966  and 1978
Goals,  Strategies  and  Directions
The majority of Japanese  during the early part of the postwar period wanted
nothing  but to restore the economy  to the prewar economic levels and to be-
come a wealthy  nation through industrialization.  Takafusa  (1994) calls this
resolve a "national  consensus for building  a wealthy nation."  This  goal was
clearly articulated  in the National  Income-Doubling Plan that was launched
during  the period. The Plan sought to double either the  real gross national
product or the real gross national expenditure of Japan within  a decade.  Thus,
capital investments stepped up. In fact, the  White Paper on the Economy for
1961 employed the phrase "investment breeds investment" to describe the ac-
celeration of investment  during the period.
Japan's growth strategy during the period had three  major features:  (1)
unbalanced  growth wherein key  industries were selected  ftlr promotion; (2) export
orientation; and (3) introduction, assimilation, and improvement of foreign ad-
vanced technology. Another very important feature of Japan's growth strategy
was the "continued reliance on the part of the government  and the private sector
alike on the role of industrial  policy in managing the long-term industrial  and
economic development of the nation" (Hirono 1980). Thus, the overall indus-
trial  policy utilized  all government policy measures in a systematic way and
in the "most appropriate combinations  so that industrial  development  may take
place  in a more  planned fashion, moving  from lower stage  to higher stage  without
interruption,  and (so that it) may be accelerated  sufficiently ahead of time when
changes in demand appear at home and abroad" (Hirono 1980).
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In the unbalanced growth strategy,6 heavy  industries were given more em-
phasis  than light industries.  These  industries  included  electric  power,  steel,  marine
transportation,  coal, and petrochemical. During the period, major bottlenecks
were often found in the electric power  industry. Electric power  was in extremely
short supply, resulting in regular power  outages.  It was therefore thought that
growth  could  proceed  only if power  supplies  were to  be massively  expanded.  Figure
4 shows how power capacity considerably  expanded  during the period.
In the steel industry,  the capacity was short and therefore had to be ex-
panded and improved. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
Source:  Quoted  from  Takafusa,  1994.  Original  source:  Nihon  Kaihatsu  Ginko  Nijugonen  Shi (A Twenty-five-Year-
History  of Japan  Development  Bank),  1976
Note:  In  addition,  10,000  kilowatts  of  nuclear  power  were  completed  in 1961-65  and  1,320,000  kilowatts  in  1966-70.
6 An economic approach  to development  first advocated  by Hirshman  (1958). There is also another approach  called
the balanced  growth strategy by Nurske  (1953). The unbalanced  approach  holds that the most important  sector be
given priority first because  developing  countries  usually  lack the capital  necessary  to develop  all sectors  simultaneously.
Greater investments  will therefore have to be poured  into these selected  industries  only. Growth in these sectors will
consequently  result  in increased  growth  in the other  sectors. On the other hand,  the balanced  growth  theory states that
all sectors have to be developed  simultaneously.  This is because  all industries  are linked and interdependent.  If only
few industries  are selected,  growth will be hindered  because  their products  would have limited  markets. Market limits
take place when other industries  (which contribute  to the overall market)  are not allowed  to grow as much as the key
ones. Thus the unbalanced  growth  approach  creates its  own  bottlenecks.
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instituted  two  rationalization  programs. The first  (1951-1955) gave empha-
sis to the  introduction  of rolling  processes  to produce steel sheets. This was
the area in which Japan was significantly  behind during  that period. In the
second  program,  investment was focused on rolling  processes.  As a result of
these programs, production capacity was boosted  from 12.5 million metric tons
of pig iron,  28.2 million  metric  tons of crude steel, and 140 million  metric
tons of rolled steel.
World War II. wiped out almost completely  the merchant  marine. It therefore
had to be rebuilt  from scratch, A massive program was implemented  to re-
build the industry.  Table 14 shows how the capacity of the industry  improved
drastically  during  the period.  It  also shows how much government finance
was made available for construction.
Since Japan at that  time  was heavily  dependent on coal as a source of
energy, the industry  had to be promoted. However, at about the same period,
there was a concerted effort to substitute  petroleum for coal as a source of
energy. It  was then that the  petrochemical industry  started to pick up and
became the window of opportunities  for advanced foreign technology to flow
into  Japan. As a result,  the  industry  became one of the fastest-growing  in-
dustries in postwar Japan between  the late 1950s  and early 1970s.  Petrochemi-
cal complexes were built.  New technologies were imported  and further  de-
veloped. The growth  of the  industry  resulted  in the birth  of new industries
and created a flood of new technologies. It is interesting  to note that  it was
during this  period that  Japan had the capacity to absorb all these technolo-
gies because of its  well-trained  and experienced workforce.  According to
Table  14. Japan's  Shipbuilding  Program
Contract  price  for

































Source: Quoted  from Takafusa,  1994
Original  source: Nihon Kaihatsu  Ginko  Nijugonen  Shi (A Twenty-Five-  Year-History  of Japan Development  Bank), 1976
25Takafusa (1994), "it was this  latent  strength that underpinned the rapid eco-
nomic growth of the postwar period."
Although one of the major strategies of Japan was export orientation, this
was not realized until  it started to develop  indigenous products and processes
(Nagoaka 1989). Therefore, initially  it  relied  heavily  on the domestic mar-
ket. Thus,  during the early years after the war the importation  and assimi-
lation of foreign technology was associated  with sales to the domestic market
(i.e., ~ither import substitution  or development of a new market in the domes-
tic market). Substantial export expansion  came about only when Japan started
to produce  indigenous products. It took considerable  technological  effort, though,
for newly introduced technology  to generate sizeable  exports.
Technological  Development Strategy of Japan
There were clear shifts through time in technological emphasis in Japan.
In the 1940s and 1950s, imported technologies were of prewar origin.  These
included the coking, vinyl chloride resin, and nylon manufacturing technologies
(Hirono 1985). Once these technologies were imported, they were adapted to
the needs and conditions of Japanese companies in terms of manpower, ma-
chinery, management,  and money.  They  were also continuously  improved. These
developments  gave  rise to new  industries such  as  those of the synthetic, chemical
fiber manufacturing,  and petrochemicals.
In the middle  to the late  1950s, imported  technologies found  their  way
into  machinery and metal production. Later,  in the 1960s,  the application of
these technologies  spread into the manufacturing of electrical machinery, gen-
eral machinery,  precision machinery,  and shipbuilding.  It  was also during
the 1960s when a whole range of electronic products came  into existence. Fur-
thermore, as a result of technological  innovations that took place  in the chemical
industry in the 1950s,  the iron and steel  industries became  modernized,  boosting
their production. Thus, these industries  saw considerable growth within  the
period.
In sum, the technological development strategy of Japan supported the
whole industrialization  process. Japan allowed the importation  of advanced
foreign technologies into  the industries  that  had been initially  targeted  to
start  the process after the war.  Because of well-educated and well-trained
technical and scientific  manpower, these foreign technologies were absorbed
adequately into  the industries.  Also, because of sufficient  absorptive capa-
bilities,  improvements were introduced into these technologies.
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Figure  5 indicates the flow of foreign technologies into Japan, which be-
came rapid  in the second half of the 1960s until  it peaked in 1972. Figure  6
also shows a massive inflow of foreign technologies as payments for the flow
of technical know-how surpassed significantly  the receipts.
Imported advanced foreign technologies went into three major industries.
From the period 1950 to 1977, chemical industries  absorbed 17.5 percent of
the inflow of foreign technologies (Table 15). Over the same period, machin-
ery absorbed 25.8 percent, of which specialized machinery accounted for 15.3
percent. Electrical  equipment also absorbed a sizeable share of 17.1 percent.
Two important  developments are worth  noting here:  (a) that  the  inflow  of
Figure  5. Technology  Inflow  Into  Japan
Figure  6. Japan's  Import-Export  Balance  of  Technical  Knowhow  (Y100  million)
Source:  White  Papers  of  Japan,  1969-70
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advanced  foreign  technologies  came  in the  form  of either  imported  machin-
ery and  equipment  or through  licensed Japanese  manufacturers  who produced
with  or without  foreign  equity  participation  (Hirono  1985); and  (b) that  these
industries  were  the  initial  focus  of the  industrial  policy  after  the  war,  thus
synchronizing  the  technological  development  strategy  with  the  general  frame-
work  of industrial  policy.
The  process did  not remain  static.  In fact,  a new trend  in  technological  in-
novation  emerged in the  1970s (Hirono  1985). Although  foreign  advanced tech-
nology continued  to flow  in,  greater  emphasis  was  given to  research and devel-
opment  (R&D)  to develop indigenous  technology.  Also, pressures  arose from the
fact  that  local manufacturers  were  finding  it  hard  to  import  advanced  foreign
technologies  when they had no technologies to offer in return.  Furthermore,  there
were  clear  indications  that  Japan  had  been  fast  closing  the  technological  gap
with  the advanced countries  of Europe  and America.  Table  16 shows that  while
the  total  number  of licensed  technologies  increased  from  564 in  1963 to  952 in
1968, imports  of new technologies  declined  from  366 in  1963 to  282 in 1968. As
a result,  the ratio  of new imported  technologies to total licensed technologies dras-
tically  went  down  from  64.9  percent  in  1963 to  29.6  percent  in  1968.  All  this
indicates  that  the  number  of attractive  technologies  that  could  be imported  on
profitable  terms declined  significantly  during  the period.
Because of the  overwhelmingly  positive  spillover  effects of R&D  on the tech-
nological base, both Japanese industrialists  and the  government  stepped up their
R&D  activities.  Figure  7 indicates  the rise in R&D  expenditure.  From a ratio  to
gross national  product  (GNP) of 1.3 percent in  1962, it increased to  1.7 percent in
1970, 2.0 percent  in 1980, and  2.7 percent in 1989. Aside  from  government  R&D
expenditure, the government also actively promoted science  and technology  in general
Table  17 shows the rapid  increase in the  government  budget for the promotion  of
science and technology.  From  9 billion  yen in  1963, the  promotional  budget  in-
creased to 37.4 billion  yen in  1972 (about 3.3 percent of the total  national  budget).
These funds  were budgeted  for national  universities,  research institutions,  subsi-
dies, among others (Tables 1&  and 18b).
Another  important  component  of the  technological  development  strategy
in  Japan  was  that  while  the  government  promoted  its  development  in  line
with  the  industrial  policy,  it placed  the  private  sector in the  forefront  of R&D
activities.  As we shall  observe later,  the  private  sector accounted  for the  main
part  of R&D  activities,  having  been motivated  by various  forms  of  govern-
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Table  18a.  Breakdown  of  Total  Budget  Related  to Science  and  Technology  (Y100  million)
Total  budget










































Source:  White  Papers  of  Japan,  1973-74



















































Source:  White  Papers  of  Japan,  1973-74
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Choice  of Appropriate  Technology
Central to the economic literature  in the 1950s and 1960s on how to ac-
celerate development  was the lengthy debate on the choice  of appropriate tech-
nology, which is discussed lengthily  in the next section along with  the gov-
ernment policy measures that effected this choice. At this point, we shall put
this choice in theoretical perspective.
Assume that the initial  factor price ratio is (wlr)o in Figure 8a, where w
is the wage rate while  r is the price of capital.  Given this  factor price, the
appropriate  choice of technology is given at point A. At this  point  an output
level of qo  is produced. In modernizing the sector, government exerted effort
to substitute  labor for advanced equipment and machinery, which is equiva-
lent to shifting  the  point  of operation to point B. This  point represents an-
other  set of technology which is  usually  arrived  at by distorting  the  factor
price ratio  to (wlr)l.  Normally,  the policy measure to effect this  factor price
change,is by artificially  lowering  r through  government subsidies on inter-
est rates or on the  cost of borrowing.  Often, this  is accompanied by another
policy measure that  artificially  overvalues the foreign exchange rate so that
the importation  of advanced equipment becomes  less costly. Therefore at point
B, capital K1 is employed, while  employment is reduced to L,
However, the policy-induced shift is theoretically inefficient.  In a labor-
abundant economy,  at K1 of capital, L20f labor may be readily available. If the
old choice of technology were retained (represented by the ray in which point
A lies), then q  1  level of output would be attainable. In the choice of technology
where the factor price ratio was distorted, (wlr)I'  labor represented by the line
segment L1L2  would be forced to work in the less productive and less efficient
informal  sector, which is outside the sector where the process of moderniza-
tion is taking place. This informal  sector will be producing at an output level
of qi' which is less than the difference between qo  and q,  Thus, qo  + qi will  be
less than q, Therefore, the new choice  of technology  is inefficient.
This  argument  can also apply to the production function  shown in Fig-
ure 8b.  Capital of ko that produces an output of qo  corresponds to point A in
the previous chart.  If capital is augmented to k1,  which represents the same
level of capital earlier,  the potential  output is ql'  which is the same level as
in the previous chart.  However, with  a distorted  factor price,  q  1 is  not at-
tained.  It is ql'that  is reached, which is lower than q,  The gap between (ql-
qlJ represents the loss in potential  output due to technical inefficiency.  The
inefficiency  can be due to a number of factors like the lack of mastery of the
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adopted production  engineering and method and the absence of competitive
incentives due to price distortions  created by government subsidies.
Thus, given this labor-abundant  economy,  the appropriate  choice  of technology
should  be small-scale  and labor-intensive,  which require a small amount  of capital
investment. This kind of technology  would generate  maximum employment  effects.
It is not developed  in foreign  countries,  being  a traditional domestic  technology.
It  is  important  to highlight  the results  of this  theory in  discussing the
Japan experience because, given its  factor endowments, which can be gen-
erally  described as labor-abundant,  and inadequate  supply of raw materi-
als, Japan had opted for something like  point B for its choice of technology
instead of point A. In particular,  Japan did  not substitute  labor for capital
but  for resources (Choi 1983). Furthermore,  it  increased the  efficiency  of
limited  capital  by using high and advanced technology in its  pursuit  of ex-
port-oriented  industrialization.  It strengthened the  international  competi-
tiveness  of few and key strategic  industries  ,by a bold introduction  and ap-
plication of up-to-date advanced technologies developed in foreign countries.
The possible  theoretical  results  of the  shift,  as discussed above, may po-
tentially  result  in some inefficiency.  But  in the case of Japan, because of
its well-planned and well-coordinated industrial policy, it successfully  adapted
advanced western technologies to its  own particular  economic conditions  in
its  industrialization  process. It also overcame  the possible inefficiencies and
therefore  attained  a rapid  economic growth.  Imported  technologies  were
adapted to specific industrial,  commercial, and market requirements in Japan.
Product development, including  design and packaging was made to fit  lo-
cal preferences, as were advertising,  sales promotion, and customer services
(Hirono  1985). The point to emphasize here is that  the choice of appropri-
ate technologies should fit  well into the circumstances affecting the economy.
The  technological  adaptation  effort,  therefore,  must be within  the  overall
framework  of industrial  policy.
Government Policies
In the  early 1950s the  government passed two important  laws to re-in-
vigorate  the  economy after the  ruins  of the  war. 7 These were the  Law for
the Acceleration of Rationalization  of Enterprises  and the  Special Taxation
1 Discussion  is largely based on Takafusa  (1995)
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Measures Law. The former,  drawn up by MITI  in 1952, designated the fol-
lowing industries  to be the main focus: iron, steel, steel rolling,  oil refining,
,metals, chemical fertilizer,  soda, and dyes (Takafusa 1995). Policy measures
targeted to these industries  included subsidies to upgrade technology; loans
of government-owned machinery and equipment; shortened depreciation pe-
riod for experimental and research facilities;  special depreciation provisions
for the installation  of modern plant and equipment, in particular,  50 percent
depreciation of the purchase price in the first  year; and reductions in excise
taxes for modern plant and equipment. According to Takafusa (1995), the re-
duction  in excise taxes for fixed  assets and the  depreciation of 50 percent
proved to be effective in stimulating  corporate investments.
Furthermore,  the law also required  both central and local governments
to improve roads and port facilities,  which where essential to further  stimu-
lating industry.  Construction of infrastructure was basically funded from public
resources to attract  more industries  to the rural  regions.
The Special Taxation Measures Law, on the other hand, allowed the ac-
celeration of depreciation. In particular,  it allowed 40 to 50 percent of the value
of a machine to be depreciated and counted as a loss in the  first  year or so
after installation  even though the machine was expected  to last more than 10
years. Under this scheme,  when companies  made big investments, their losses
got magnified, resulting in lower profits and therefore lower tax base.
Takafusa (1995)  says the accelerated  depreciation  scheme  was flawed from
the perspective of "fairness," but adds that the law was designed in the first
place to favor accumulation of capital.  On hindsight,  it may be safe to argue
that  the incentives provided  by these laws played a major role in the post-
war development of Japanese  industry,  as many companies  embarked on am-
bitious  programs of capital investment. Moreover, it was in the 1950s when
Japan's policies took shape and proved to be effective.
The postwar period also witnessed the passage of two  landmark  pieces
of legislation,  based on MITI's  belief that the machine and electronic indus-
tries  were vital  to industrialization.  These were the  Law for Special Provi-
sional Measures to Promote the  Machinery  Industry  and the  Law for Spe-
cial  Provisional  Measures to Promote Electronics Industry.  These laws al-
lowed MITI  to  draw up rationalization  plans and to secure funds  for their
implementation  from these industries.  Furthermore,  according to Takafusa
(1995), these laws allowed the  establishment of "cartels  covering the items
manufactured,  their quantities,  and technology,"
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Government  continued to pursue policies for the promotion of technological
innovations.8 Hirono  (1985) groups these policies into three main categories:
(a) tax measures; (b) provisions of government subsidies to private  industry,
research  organizations,  and universities and other institutions of higher learning
and specialized disciplines;  and (c) provision and improvement  of economic,
social, and administrative  infrastructure  for promoting R&D activities  and
technological innovations  in the private  sector.
The tax measures included the accelerated depreciation of allowances for
plant, machinery, and equipment used in R&D activities in the strategic sectors
identified  by the MITI.  There were also reductions in real estate or property
taxes and business taxes for R&D installations  and programs in "technopolis"
(locations of technology industries) across  the country.  In particular,  partial
deductions were allowed from corporate income tax in cases  where (a) R&D
expenditures  went beyond the  maximum  in the  past tax years; (b) income
was derived from technology  export; and (c) pecuniary contributions were made
to non-profit  research organizations.
Other local tax measures were exemptions of property tax, utilities  tax,
and property  acquisition  tax for R&D  installations  and assets acquired  by
non-profit  educational institutions;  and reduction  in  property  tax for R&D
plant and equipment owned and managed by mining and industrial  technol-
ogy research cooperatives.
High tariffs,  including q~titative  import restrictions and other non-tariff
barriers,  were also utilized  to shield the protected strategic sectors from for-
eign competition and to widen local production and the industrial base of Japan.
The strategic sectors  importing advanced  technologies  received  attractive export
incentives  so they could expand both their  output and export, thus  exploit-
ing the economies  of scale in production.
Table 19 shows a detailed  set of fiscal incentives for technology-related
activities  in Japan. Incidentally,  some  econometric studies confirmed that  in
the  1950s, the  fiscal incentives  were fairly  effective in  raising  the  level of
private  investment (Nagaoka 1989). In particular,  the accelerated deprecia-
tion scheme  helped companies not only by increasing their rate of return  from
investment but also by reducing credit risks for banks. Studies also show that
targeted measures, such as tax exemptions for commercializing new products,
-
8  Discussion  here is largely based on Hirano (1985),  which in turn was largely based on the Science and Technology
Agency White Paper, 1982.
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Table 19. Fiscal Incentives for Introduction  of New  Technology in Japan
Source: Nagaoka (1989)
A  Before  the revision of 1957,  this scheme used to apply not  only to the commercialization  of new products  but  also
to the production of such products  as minerals  and  coals.
BThe revision took Iplace  in 1960. The scheme was transfonmed  to serving the prevention of industrial pollution,
etc., from serving Industrial development
cCurrentiy 20 perCE!nt  of the excess can be counted as a tax credit.
DRight-hand  column describes incentives applicable from 1958-1960. Major curtailment  took place in 1961 with
some incentives irltegrated in the statutory schedule of  depreciation.
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were ineffective in encouraging new i~dustries to grow, especially during their
infancy  or initial  stage. These industries  involve synthetic  fibers,  synthetic
rubber, fertilizer,  petrochemicals, and antibiotics.
Apart  from tax reductions and exemptions, there were also provisions for
low-interest loans by government  fmancial institutions.  For example,  the Japan
Development Bank provided  such low-interest  loans for R&D  activities  de-
veloping indigenous technology, innovating large-scale computer technology,
and producing high technology in electronics and machinery industries.
Another  example was the  SME finance corporations'  provision of loans
with  low interest rates to smaller enterprises that conducted R&D activities
related to new developments in technologies and in electronics and machin-
ery. The center for development of R&D enterprises provided smaller indus-
tries  with  guarantees for their  R&D loans from commercial banks. Further-
more, the  small and medium enterprises  credit insurance extended the in-
surance coverage for R&D activities  and for commercializing  new technolo-
gies.
Another  form  of government support was the  provision of subsidies to
private  industry  and research organizations  and universities,  including  in-
stitutions  of higher learning and specialized disciplines. Covered in this cat-
egory were R&D activities  in priority  areas such as nuclear and other sources
of energy, space, marine resources development, biotechnology, among oth-
ers. The Ministry  of Education provided subsidies to R&D .programs in sci-
ence and technology in the state universities,  research institutions,  as well
as private  universities.  For its part,  the New Technology Development Cor-
poration  granted subsidies to private  industry  to develop new technologies
and to encourage  government research  laboratories and universities to transfer
technologies to the private  sector.
MITI  contracted  out to the private  industry  many of the required  R&D
activities  for developing new large-scale industrial  technologies, energy-sav-
ing technologies, and new alternative  sources of energy, as well as for inno-
vating  medical, health  and welfare  equipment manufacturing  technologies,
and basic technologies for future  industries.
The amount of subsidies granted to R&D-related activities was huge. For
example,  in 1980  the subsidy  from the Science  and Technology  Agency  amounted
to 307.9 billion  yen, from the  Ministry  of Education 166.1 billion  yen, and
from the MITI  119.2  billion yen. Overall, these  subsidies  comprised  91.6 percent
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of Jill government subsidies for R&D activities  in the private  sector in 1980,
including  universities  and research organizations. Table 20 lists  down some
specific incentives granted by the government forR&D-related  activities  in
Japan.
Here is one very important  lesson that  can be gleaned from the  Japan
experience in  granting  i_ncentives:  Although  these incentives were directed
to particular  groups of industries,  a competitive scheme in granting  the in-
centives was pursued based on certain criteria  set by the government. This
process effectively eliminated  the possibilities of rent-seeking behavior.
The last category of government support involved the provision and im-
provement of the economic,  social, and administrative  infrastructure  for pro-
moting R&D  activity  and technological innovations  in the private  sector. A
major part of this  effort was the establishment of a national  network  on sci-
entific  and technological information  through improved cooperation and co-
ordination  among public  and private  agencies collecting, collating,  analyz-
ing, evaluating,  and publishing science  and technology information  material
in and outside of Japan. The Tsukuba Research  and Development  Park, which
was established in 1971, accelerated the research and education on science
and technology by bringing  together government research laboratories, edu-
cational institutions,  and selected  private  research  organizations and univer-
sities.
Still  another important  component of this  government support was the
streamlining  of technical  evaluation procedures and systems, including  in-
dustrial  standards. As such government and semi-government research labo-
ratories and testing stations were significantly  upgraded.
Research and Development
Basic structure. As earlier discussed,  R&D efforts in Japan increased sub-
stantially.  This was indicated  by the rise in the ratio  of R&D expenditure to
GNP mainly due to the development of indigenous technologies when Japan
was already  approaching the  technological limits  of advanced countries  in
Europe and America. Initially,  the strategy of Japan was to import advanced
technology from these countries. Howev~r, the development in Japan was so
rapid  that  it was able to close the technological gap in a relatively  short pe-
riod of time.
Although  the government actively promoted technological development,
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the private  sector, it was the private  sector that always dominated  all R&D
activities  in Japan. Table 21 and Figure 9 indicate that  almost 70 percent of
the total R&D expenditures came  from various private companies.  In the 1960s,
research  institutes  accounted  for about 17 percent of such  expenditures, which
then rose to more than  20 percent in the 1970s. The share of universities
went down from more than  20 percent in the  1960s to less than  10 percent
in 1980. All this  would indicate  that  although the government actively pur-
sued technological development in Japan, it  took the back seat as it  set up
the  necessary infrastructure  for .technological development and granted in-
centives to the private  sector.
The United  Nations  Educational,  Scientific,  and Cultural  Organization
(UNESCO) defines three  major categories of R&D activities,  namely, basic
research, applied research, and experimental  development. Basic research
involves  any experimental  or theoretical  work  undertaken  primarily  to ac-
quire new knowledge of the underlying foundations of certain phenomena and
observable facts, without  any specific application or use in view. Applied re-
search encompasses any original  investigation  undertaken  to acquire  new
knowledge. It  is, however, directed primarily  to a specific practical  aim or
objective. Experimental  development comprises any systematic work, draw-
ing on existing knowledge gained from research and/or practical experience
that is directed to producing new materials, products, and devices;  to installing
new processes,  systems and services; and to improving  substantially  those
already produced or installed.
Table  22 shows the  breakdown of R&D  activities  in  Japan in terms  of
the three categories and type of organization.  On the whole, the emphasis of
R&D was on the third  category due to the effort of the private  sector, which
dominated the R&D field, to focus on development  research.  Its share increased
from 49.1 percent-in  1970  to 58.4 percent in 1978. Basic or fundamental  re-
search as well as applied research went down over the same period. Devel-
opment research of the private  sector increased from 63.6 percent in  1970  to
77.1 percent in 1978. Research  institutes,  which captured  about 20 percent
of R&D  activities,  focused largely on applied and development research, as
indicated by the share of about 40 percent in each  category. Universities  were
originally  into  fundamental research, but moved into more applied research,
as indicated  by their  shares. In  1970  the share of fundamental  or basic re-
search in the universities  was 80 percent. In  1978, it went down to 57.3 per-
cent. On the other hand, the share of applied research  increased  from 20 percent
to 37.3 percent over the same period.
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Source:  White  Papers  of  Japan,  1971-72  and  1979-80
Of the 0 ECD countries, Japan and Germany took a generally similar  path
in R&D, in which the industry  took a dominant share, in contrast to countries
like  the United  States, France, Canada and the United  Kingdom, where the
governments took the commanding  share in R&D expenditure (Figure 10).
Objectives  of technology.  The White Papers of Japan on Science  and Tech.
nology regularly  publish  survey results  on the objectives of the private  sec-
tor in its technological efforts. Table 23 shows the major shifts  in its empha-
sis over time.  In the  1950s, the  dominant concerns were better  quality  and
performance (40 percent) and mass production (23 percent). Through time,
however, as some  of these objectives were realized, emphasis shifted to other
concerns like resource conservation (18 percent) and energy conservation (18
percent). Despite the  major shift,  however, the objectives of better  quality
and performance remained paramount.
Public-private  sector  link.  As discussed  earlier,  although the private  sec- .
tor played the  leading role in technological development in Japan, the sup-
port extended by the public was significant.  In 1961 the  law governing re-
search associations was implemented.  It  gave a legal status to cooperative
research associations. Thus, to foster further  the  link  between the private
and the public  sectors under this  law, R&D cooperatives were installed  in
major private  enterprises interested  in technological innovations  under the
guidance and financial  assistance of the MITI.  Such cooperatives were cru-
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Source: White Papers of Japan, 1979-80
also proved vital  to the apparel and non-ferrous metal manufacturing  indus-
tries. The policy proved to be very effective in research involving  high-risk,
high-cost and long-gestation R&D programs designed to develop indigenous
technology. From 1961 to 1983, 71 research associations were established.
The government led the establishment of these cooperatives,  which were used
as implementing  organizations for government-assisted R&D projects.
A  number of concerns, however, were raised against the  establishment
of these cooperatives. For example, there were fears that  the cooperatives
might not generate positive results because  the participating  companies  were
in stiff competition against each  9ther both in the factor and production markets.
As such these companies  would not assign their best scientists and engineers
to such cooperatives (Hirono  1985). Another  concern was that  such coopera-
tives  might  prevent free competition  among the  participating  firms,  result-
ing in inefficiency. Furthermore, there were criticisms from the United States
that  such cooperatives might result in unfair  competition between Japanese
and American companies, thinking  that  through the cooperatives, Japanese
companies might be pooling their resources together and that the government
might be subsidizing the participating  enterprises to make them more com-
petitive  in the international  market.
Another means whereby the link between the private and the public sec-
tors was reinforced was through the establishment  of 19 technopolis  of the MITI,
where government financial resources  were utilized  to install  the most up-to-
date economic  and social infrastructure  and facilities  conducive to the activi-
ties of technology-intensive industries. The facilities included specialized  R&D
laboratories. The local governments were also fairly  active in supporting the
private sector's effort toward technological  innovations in these technopolis.
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Another very important  feature of R&D in Japan in the early years was
the existence of trading  companies that facilitated  the  importation  of tech-
nologies, both general and specialized, most suited to local manufacturers.
Such trading  companies served as the identifiers  of technology needs within
Japan and of the  availability  of such technologies abroad. These companies
were instrumental  not only in supplying information  to the technology buy-
ers in Japan,  but also in investing  their  own financial  resources in  setting
up their  manufacturing  subsidiaries  either unilaterally  or in joint  ventures
with  foreign suppliers  of imported  technologies or the  local buyers of tech-
nologies (Hirono 1985). But as the local buyers of technologies  gained valuable
experience, they imported  their  own technology requirements.  Local manu-
facturers  also sent local engineers and managers for training  abroad. This
development was facilitated  by the Japan External  Trade Organization,  a
subsidiary  of MITI,  which obtained  the  necessary information  on the  na-
ture,  costs, and benefits of alternative  technologies available  abroad.
National  research laboratories played an important  complementary role
for private  R&D.  These laboratories  served five  areas: (a) basic research
not undertaken  by universities;  (b) applied  research involving  large-scale
research equipment;  (c) technology transfer;  (d) research that  private  in-
dustry  could  not adequately undertake  (e.g., pollution  issues); and  (e) re-
search for the establishment of standards, testing methods, and norms. Fur-
thermore,  these national  research laboratories  provided  basic technologi-
cal information  in the planning  stages of private  R&D (Nagaoka 1989). To-
gether with  MITI  these laboratories played a major role in cooperative R&D.
In addition,  they were the  major agents of assessing private  R&D projects
assisted  by the  government.  Also,  by accepting researchers  from the  pri-
vate enterprises  as trainees,  these laboratories  were able to transfer  R&D
skills  to the private  sector.
Patent system. Japan has a long history  of patent  protection  (Nagoaka
1989). The first  patent  regulation  was established  in 1885. In  1899 it  ac-
ceded to the Paris  Convention and accepted applications  by foreigners.  Ac-
tive  patenting  activities  have remained  active since then.  One feature  of
the  system was the  protection  of a utility  model.9 More than 40 percent of
the  world  patent  applications  have been filled  by the Japanese in  recent
years.
9 Patent protection for  utility model was implemented by virtue of a 1905 legislation that followed the German
system as a model.
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Apparently,  R&D  activities  have been encouraged greatly  by the  very
active  patent  system in Japan.  Apart  from the  system's positive  impact,
particularly  with  respect to the  appropriateness  of R&D  benefits,  it pro-
vided  a vehicle  for  evaluating  and recognizing the  technological  effort  of
workers  by the  patent  experts.  In particular,  many companies  in  Japan
offered  a special incentive  to encourage employees to create innovations
and  suggest improvements.  This  widened the  participation  in  inventing
activities  in Japan.
Manpower Development
Structure of workforce. One of the  major driving  forces of technological
development and rapid  economic growth in Japan was the absorptive capa-
bility  of its manpower. Imported technologies  were adapted, assimilated, and
diffused because  of its well-trained  labor force. Figure 11 shows the continu-
ous rise in the pool of researchers;irom  106 researchers per 1000 persons in
1962, the number grew to 172 in 1970, 303 in 1980, and 462 in 1989. Similar
to R&D expenditure  discussed above, the private  sector employed a sizeable
part (more than  50 percent) of this  pool of researchers (Table 24). Research
institutions employed  fewer  researchers  compared  to the universities as a whole.
As expected, in terms of research specialization, the researchers special-
ized in areas where demand existed. Table  25 indicates  that  in the second
half of the 1960s,  more than 20 percent of the researchers  specialized  in chem.
istry  and related  fields,  14 percent in machinery,  and about 12 percent in
electrical and related  fields.  Of those employed in the private  sector, more
than  30 percent had  specialization  in chemistry,  20 percent in machinery,
and 18 percent in electrical and related fields. Note that these were the same
industries  on which the early industrialization  process after the war focused.
In  research institutes  researchers specialized in agriculture  (about 27 per-
cent) and chemistry  (16 percent), while  researchers in universities  were in
medicine (about 40 percent) and chemistry (11 percent).
Formal  educational system.  The early educational system in Japan can
be traced back to the Meiji  Restoration that  began in 1868, when a group of
reform-minded  leaders created an educational system that  integrated  vari-
ous aspects of French, German, and other Western models with  indigenous
social and cultural  elements. However, after World War II  when Japan was
occupied by the Americans, the system was modified through major reforms.
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Figure  11.  Researchers  per 1000  Persons
50The reforms were based on a mission report containing the blueprint  for the
postwar Japanese educational system submitted by a group of American edu-
cators and other U.S. experts. The basic philosophy of the  reform was the
democratization  of education. The reform was meant to dismantle  the cen-
tralized,  multitrack  educational  system in  Japan over the  last three-quar-
ters of the century into  an American-style  decentralized, egalitarian,  single-
track system.  Japan  had adopted  a 6-3-3-4  single-track school  system  throughout
the country.  Six years of elementary education and three years of lower sec-
ondary education became  compulsory.
The other major reforms in the educational system included:  (1) the in-
troduction  of public elections for the boards of education; (2) the liberalized
publication  of textbooks; (3) the flexibility  of planning for the school  curricu-
lum;  (4) the consolidation of highly variegated secondary  schools  into middle
and high schools; and (5) the consolidation of various institutions  for higher
education into  two-year junior  colleges and four-year universities.
When the American occupation ended in .1952,  certain sectors sought to
revive the old system. Indeed, several changes were re-introduced  into  the
system, but  still  the egalitarian,  open structure  of the  school system based
of the American system remained.
During Japan's rapid growth in the 1950s,  enrollment in secondary  schools
surged. The ratio  of high school students increased from 52 percent in 1955
to 58 percent in 1960, to 71 percent in 1965, to 82 percent in 1970, and more
than  90 percent in 1975. In 1991 enrollment  in  elementary and secondary
schools  reached 100 percent (Table 26). This high rate was mainly due to the
compulsory educational system requiring  six years of elementary and three
years of lower secondary  education.
Higher  education also became  popular, as evidenced by the sharp rise in
enrollment  in two- and four-year college courses. The ratio  of 18-year-olds
that proceeded  to higher  education increased from 10 percent in 1955 to  17
percent in 1965, to 24 percent in 1970, and to 38 percent in 1975. These re-
sults  contrasted  sharply  with  prewar levels. For example, in  1935 only 40
percent of all students who completed elementary schooling  continued to sec-
ondary school, and only a tiny  3 percent went on to higher education.
Japan's educational system did not only provide an equal education op-
portunity,  it also ensured the same quality of education in all schools,  thereby
reducing regional disparities. The generally similar quality of education across
regions was ensured by the  setting  of clear standards  for  school facilities,
and the existence of well-qualified  and better-paid teachers, among others.
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cent was spent for private  universities  and colleges, and 22 percent for up-
per secondary  schools.  Apart from these subsidies,  the government  also granted
resources for educational and research equipment and facilities,  which have
been increasing in recent years.
Other trainings. Institutions  for human resource development (HRD) and
other trainings  also existed. Both the national and local governments set up
vocational institutions  and centers, vocational training  colleges, and skills
development centers. In these institutions,  trainings  were also provided  for
the unemployed,  those  who wanted to look for jobs elsewhere,  those who wanted
to change jobs or look for another job after the  mandatory retirement,  and
for the handicapped.
A major feature  of the vocational training  system in Japan is the active
participation  of the private  enterprises (Nagaoka 1989). In fact,  vocational
training  is  mainly  supported by the private  sector, unlike  countries  in Eu-
rope where vocational institutions  are public  entities.  In Japan, training  is
mostly on-the-job. However, these enterprises also provide seminars or for-
mal training  courses for employees. Many large companies finance graduate
education abroad or in Japan. Company  incentives are also provided for those
who obtain certificates of skills training.  Investment in HRD in Japan by the
private  sector is supported by the unique lifetime  employment system widely
adopted after the war.  With this  system, the private  sector is encouraged to
appropriate  investments  in training  and education, since the employees are
expected to work for them for many years. Thus, HRD practice  at the com-
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Administrative  Structure
Figure  12 shows the administrative  structure  of science and technology
in Japan. Science and Technology Agency (STA) is the country's  highest ad-
ministrative  agency on science and technology. The policymaking  function,
however, was entrusted to the Council for Science  and Technology  (CST).  While
the Japanese Science  Council, with a membership of 210 experts in 1979, de-
liberated  on major theoretical issues and advises the government on science
and technology matters, the CST was entrusted with the formulation  of more
concrete policies (Choi 1983). Other related agencies include the Atomic En-
ergy Commission, the Space  Activities  Commission,  and the Council for Ocean
Development, which operates under the jurisdiction  of the Office of the Prime
Minister.
One feature of Japan's science  and technology policy formulation  is that
the  CST or the  STA sets only policy directions,  leaving the implementation
to the  relevant  ministries  and agencies. Another  interesting  feature  is the
leading  role  of  businesses  in  industrial  technology  development.  The
government's role is limited  to the  granting  of subsidies in  major projects,
tax incentives, and loans.
As the  policymaking  body, the  CST proposed to the Prime  Minister  in
1971 the following science  and technology goals (Choi 1983):
a.  Apply science  and technology  to the country's social  and economic  needs
as a means of promoting their advancement;
b.  Promote science and technology after laying  down their  foundations;
and
c.  Promote basic science.
In 1977  the same  council  proposed  the following as the basic  goals of Japan's
science  and technology policy:
a.  Secure a stable supply of resources and their economization;
b.  Search  for appropriate solutions to environmental and industrial  safety
problems;
c.  Improve public  health and medical systems;
d.  Promote pilot science  and technology projects; and
e.  Foster  technology  power to promote  international  cooperation and
strengthen the nation's international  competitiveness.
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Figure  12.  Science  and Technology  Administrative  Structure  of Japan
Source Choi,  1983 Ori9inal  source:  Science  and  Technology  Agency  (Japan),  Science  and  Technoiogy  Handbook,  1979
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Patterns  of Growth
The Philippine  economic growth has been  described as dismal in the last
two decades. It  went through  a "roller-coaster ride"  in the 1980s and 1990s
(Figure  13). The early 1980s saw the economy  growing at 3.5 percent. In the
period  1984 to  1985, the  economy  contracted by a significant  -14.6 percent
in real terms. This economic  collapse was brought about by the political  tur-
moil arising from the assassination  of a major political opponent of the Marcos
administration.  When Corazon  Aquino took over the presidency in  1986,  the
economy  bounced  back strongly with a high growth rate of 6.8 percent in 1988.
However, this was not sustained. The economy  started to take a dip thereaf-
ter because  of a number of reasons,  foremost  of which were the series of military
coup attempts,  natural  calamities, electric power crisis, and unfavorable in-
ternational  economic environment.  But when Fidel V. Ramos was elected to
the presidency in 1992, the economy  recovered again, attaining  a growth of
about 6 percent in 1996. The familiar  problem of unsustainability  of growth
surfaced anew when the economy  started sliding in the succeeding  years. Mainly
because  of the Asian financial crisis that broke out in mid-1997  and the drought
brought  about by the  EI Nino phenomenon in  1998,  the economy again con-
tracted.  There was a slight  recovery though in 1999, but at the rate the po-
litical  situation is deteriorating at present,IO  this might not be sustained based
on the last 20 years of the country's boom-bust growth track record. Indeed,
the economic  prospects for the Philippines  do not look promising.
10  On January 20, 2001 the Vice-President  was sworn into the Office of the President  because of graft and corruption
charges against  the elected president  whose  term of office was supposed  to end in 2004.
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Figure  13.  Real  GDP  Growth  (%),  Philippines
Source:  Philippine  National  Income  Accounts,  various  issues
Indeed, the Philippine  economy  is moving along a boom-bust growth cycle.
While,it  may be true  that  the  political  instability  is a major factor behind
this,  the weak economic structure  also contributed  significantly  to this  pat.
tern  of growth.  Figure  14 shows the  high  inflation  rate  during  the period.
Inflation  peaked to almost 50 percent at the height of the economic crisis  in
the mid-1980. In 1991, inflation  surged again. High inflation  during the pe-
riod was caused mainly  by macroeconomic  mismanagement, as indicated  by
huge government budget deficit and unsustainable  accumulation of both for-
eign and domestic debts.
Figure 15 shows estimates of TFP. Except in the second  half of the 1980s,
TFP estimates were negative. In the 1990s TFP estimates were all negative
as well. The sectoral TFP analysis of Cororaton and Cuenca (2001) shows a
clear example of uncoordinated and policy failures  in the Philippines,  which
created unfavorable resource allocation effects, weak economic  fundamentals,
and less growth.  Their  analysis indicates that  it was the service sector that
pulled  down the overall TFP growth. Furthermore,  they found that  although
the  contribution  of TFP was negative for the whole economy, there was ac-
tually  an improvement  during the 1990s. From a negative contribution  dur-
ing the 1980s, it made a slightly positive contribution during the 1990s. Based
on their  sectoral TFP analysis, the pattern  for agriculture  was similar:  from
negative TFP contribution  in the 1980s  to positive contribution  in the 1990s.
For mining,  manufacturing,  and utilities  the contribution of TFP growth was
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Figure  14.  Inflation  in the Philippines  (%)
Source: Selected  Philippine  Economic  Indicators,  various  issues
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positive  during  the  two  decades. However,  there  was a significant  slowdown
during  the  1990s relative  to the  1980s. Generally,  for  nontradables,  particu-
larly  the  service-related  sectors,  capital  accumulation  type  of growth  was evi-
dent.
Based  on their  TFP  estimates,  Cororaton  and  Cuenca  (2001)  concluded
that  trends  were  both  favorable  and unfavorable.  Sectoral  estimates  showed
improving  TFP  in  the  1990s, although  a  number  of the  sectoral  TFP  levels
were  still  negative.  However,  for the  economy as a whole,  1990 saw a slight
decline  in TFP.  This  may indicate  the  presence  of unfavorable  reiource  allo-
cation  effects  because of the  capital  accumulation  type  of  growth  in the  non-
tradable  sectors,  particularly  the  service-related  ones, relative  to the  rest  of
the  sectors  in the  economy.  One  factor  that  could  have  triggered  this  capital
accumulation  type  of growth  was the  prolonged  real  appreciation  of the  cur-
rency  in  the  face of  an aggressive  trade  reform  program  in  the  first  half  of
the  1990s. This  kind  of an economic  environment  is  usually  not conducive  to
production  activities,  both  for domestic  consumption  and exports.  In  a period
when  capital  inflow  is  massive  (in  mid-1990s,  as  will  be  pointed  shortly),
nontradable  sectors like  the  real  estate  sector becomes an attractive  destina-
tion  of capital.
Table  30 shows the  investment  pattern  during  the  period.  Similar  to the
output  growth  path,  a dip  in the  investment  ratio  occurred  in the  mid-1980s.
However,  there  was  a significant  improvement  in the  1990s.  One of the  ma-
jor factors behind  this  was the surge in  net foreign  direct investments.  However,
a major  part  of this  investment  went to the real. estate  sector because of policy
failure,  as pointed  out above, and  therefore  the  impact  on productive  capac-
ity  was  minimal  since  some of the  real  estate  investments  were  speculative
in nature.  These  consisted  of investments  in condominiums  and  other  high-
rise  structures  and  buildings.  On the  other  hand,  net  portfolio  investment
picked  up  during  the  same period.  But  they  were  highly  speculative  as well,
because  when the  Asian  financial  crisis  broke  out in  1997, these investments
evaporated  immediately.
Savings  are  not adequate  to finance  investments.  Figure  16 shows  that
the  savings  rate11  has  always  been below  the  investment  rate,  It  was  only
in three  instances  when  the  savings  rate  surpassed  the  investment  rate:  in~
11  "Savings rate' here refers to the gross national savings computed  using the resource  gap formula, that is, gross
domestic investment  plus current account  balance net of official  transfers.
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1986, 1988 and 1999. In these years, investments were low because of eco-
nomic recession. For sure, this is one major economic  fundamental where the
Philippines  should improve  on to make the economic activities  viable.  Cer-
tainly,  this is difficult  to achieve in an atmosphere of political  instability.
However, significant structural changes  have been taking place since the
1950s. Table 31 shows that  agriculture  sector captured  34.7 percent of pro-
duction  in 1950. Through the years, this  share declined, so that  by 1998 it
was only 17.4 percent. The share of industry increased during the period when
the government embarked on an import  substitution  policy. From a share of
27.1 in 1950, it increased to 38.8 percent in 1980. Similarly,  the share of the
manufacturing  sector increased from 16.1 percent in  1950  to 25.7 percent in
1980. Seemingly, one indicator  of failure  of industrialization  in the Philip-
pines is the declining share of industry,  particularly  the manufacturing  sec-
tor,  in the last two decades.  The shares declined to 31.8 percent in  1998 for
industry  in general and to 21.8 percent for manufacturing  in particular.  Over
this  long period, the share of the service sector increased from 38.2 percent
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Table  31.  Philippine  Sectoral  Gross  Domestic  Product  (percentage  share)
Source: Economic  and Social Statistics  Office,  National  Statistical  Coordination  Board
Table  32 shows the structure  of our employment. Generally,  a similar
pattern  is observed in the  sectoral share of employment. There was a clear
movement from agriculture  to the service sector. More  striking  is the pat-
tern of employment  in the manufacturing sector,  which has stagnated at around
10 percent of total  employment in the  last  40 years. This  labor movement
could have aggravated the pressing problem of poverty in the country because
of low productivity  in the service sector. De Dios (1993) observes that  "the
decline in the share of agriculture  in employment has been significant;  but
since the industrial  share has stagnated, it is services, a large part of which
is in the so-called 'informal  sector', which served as the receptacle for labor
shed by agriculture  but which industry  failed to absorb. The lack of employ-
ment opportunities  condemns  the majority of the labor force to jobs with  low
productivity  and poor pay."
One must also note the significant  changes that have taken place in the
export sector in the  last three decades.  The share of the  semiconductor in-
dustry  surged from zero in 1970 to  48 percent of total  merchandise export
receipts in  1999 (Table 33 and Figure  17). If finished  electrical machinery is
included, the total share is more than half of the total exports. However, the
value-added component of semiconductor exports is very thin  because only
labor contribution  comes from local sources. All the rest comes from foreign
sources. In fact, the semi~onductor industry  in the Philippines  is only at the
assembly stage. The production process has to progress and to move up the
ladder for it to contribute significantly to the economy.  And there can  be sizeable
room for growth in this area  because  of  the advent  of information technology.
Garments used to be a major export item,  but their  share has declined
since 1990. The shares of agriculture-based exports have also been declining
such as sugar, coconut-related crops, banana, as well as mining-related  com-
modities like copper.
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Table  33.  Philippine  Exports  (percentage  share of  major  items)












































































Semiconductors  and electrononic
microcircuits
Finished  electrical  machinery
Garments
Crude coconut  oil
Bars, rods of copper
Gold from copper  ores
Banana  and plantations
Copper  concentrates




Copra  oil, cake, and meal
Others
Total
Source: Economic  and Social Statistics  Office,  National  Statistical  Coordination  Board
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All told, the economic as well as the political  environment  in the Philip-
pines is generally not conducive to a sustained growth. Although  major eco-
nomic reforms are underway,  the relentless  political  squabbles among dif-
ferent quarters are in fact taking a heavy toll on the economy.
The  Importance  of R&D  in the  Philippines
In the Philippines,  Austria  (1998)  and Cororaton and Abdula  (1999) con-
ducted a regression  analysis of some  possible  determinants of TFP in the Phil-
ippines.  Highlighting  these at this  point will  put the discussion on technol-
ogy-related issues in proper perspective.
The first  study considered TFP of the entire  economy  as the  dependent
variable  in the regression, while  the second  looked at TFP of the manufac-
turing  sector. In Austria's  paper, TFP of the entire  economy  was regressed
against trade and investment policy indicators. The indicators  included tar-
iff  rates, share of exports to GDP, share of imports  to GDP, foreign  direct
investments (Fill),  and iriflation.  Both tariff  and import shares were used to
capture the trade  liberalization  program of the government through  reduc-
tion  in  tariff  and nontariff  barriers.  Fill  is one major vehicle  for transfer-
ring technology from abroad, thus its inclusion in the analysis would attempt
to capture  transfer  of technology. Inflation  is a "catch-all"  indicator  of eco-
nomic instability.  High iriflation  means macroeconomic  instability.  Normally,
economic instability  discourages  the adoption of productivity-enhancing  pro-
grams (like R&D) and investment.
The regression results  show a statistically  significant  effect of exports
on TFP growth (Table 34). The two major exports of the Philippines  are gar-
ments and semiconductors, which comprise more than  60 percent of the to-
tal merchandise exports. These exports are highly import-dependent in terms
of raw materials  and technology. In fact,  they are closely tied  up with  for-
eign buyers through consignment. Thus, the growth in exports could also be
a vehicle of technology transfer.
Contrary  to the  general expectation, imports  have a negative  effect on
TFP. There are two possible explanations  for this.  First,  in the regression,
total imports  were considered. Imports  of machinery and equipment,  which
usually  embody new production techniques and technology, are only a frac-
tion of the total. Thus, the inclusion of the total imports might have captured
other effects also. Second,  the unavailability  of skilled workers who could ad-
equately operate the  new machines and equipment might have led to their
inefficient  use, thus causing lower productivity.
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of the close tie-up  between the  major exporters in the Philippines  with  for-
eign direct buyers. However, similar  to the previous results, the same nega-
tive  effect of imports  on TFP manufacturing results.12
That tariff  has negative effects on manufacturing  TFP implies  that a re-
duction in the tariff  protection would result in productivity  improvement (pro-
bably due to efficiency gain from a competitive environment).  FDI has a sig-
nificant positive  effect on TFP.
Minimum  wage, usually wage rate for unskilled  labor, in the Philippines
is legislated.  The results  show tha,t an increase in minimum  real wage de-
creases  product~vi~y,  which is generally expected.  Usually, a wage system that
is not based on productivity  is inefficient.  Inflation,  an indicator of economic
instability,  negatively  affects productivity.  High  inflation  occurs in  an eco-
nomic system with lots of uncertainty.  This prevents organizations from pur-
suing productivity-enhancing  programs.
R&D as a percent of GDP has a positive  effect on TFP. This  fact has an
important  policy implication  because, usually,  technological change cannot
be realized without  technological infrastructure.  Furthermore,  the effective-
ness of technology transfer requires distinct  activities  and investments, and
a certain  level of technological development in the country to minimize  the
cost of implementing  the  new technology and to maximize  its  productivity
once in place. Normally,  the technological development of a country depends
upon R&D investments and on the efficiency of its R&D institutional  system.
Patterns,  Developments  and  Policies  in  R&D  and  Technology
Level of R&D efforts. Cororaton (1999) surveyed a UNESCO-based data
on R&D  indicators  for 91 countries  and found  that  the Philippines  ranked
very low in terms of R&D effort. Table 36 shows that  out of 91 countries, the
Philippines placed 73rd  in terms of number of scientists and engineers  per million
population.  It ha~ only 152 scientists and engineers per million  population.
This  is  way below the  maximum of 6,736 scientists  and engineers per mil-
lion population.  In terms of R&D  expenditure-to-GNP ratio,  the Philippines
is at the  60th  place with  a ratio  of 0.2 percent in 1992. This is far below the
maximum of 3 percent.
12  The negative coefficient  showed up when capital import was included  in the regression  instead of total imports. Al-
though  the reason  behind  this may be unclear,  the authors  attribute  this to the inappropriateness  of technology  adopted
by  industries.  Such  technology  that  functkJns  merely  as input  entails  no significant  effect  on domestic  science  and  technology
(Yap  1989).
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Table  36.  PCGNP,  SE/MP,  and  GERD/GNP  (in  91  countries  of  the  world)
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*1992 Fi9ures  computed  by DOST.
Basic source of data: UNESCO,  Statistical Yearbook,  1995; UNESCO,  Wortd  Science Report, 1996; World Bank,
World  Development  Reporl, 1996
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observed that  more than  30 percent of R&D  personnel with  Ph.D. degrees
are in social sciences,  while  only less than 10 percent are in the fields  of en-
gineering and technology (Figures  18 and 19). About 15 percent are in agri-
cultural  sectors.
S&T  background, policies and programs. Philippine  S&T's long history
can be traced  back to the  early American  colonial period  during  which the
Bureau of Science was created. The American government, through the Bu-
reau, formed the Philippine  S&T.  However, the coverage was very limited,
as it mainly focused on agriculture,  health and food processing.  Thus, because
of the colonial economic  policy, the development of industrial  technology was
largely  neglected. Yet it proved to be an effective training  ground  for Fili-
pino scientists  following  the  establishment  of the public  school system dur-
ing the same period.
The setting up of the public school system paved the way for the creation .
of the University  of the Philippines  (UP) system and the various S&T-related
agencies  and laboratories.
Major shifts  in the direction of Philippine  S&T took place right  after the
proclamation  of independence in 1946. Among others, the Bureau was reor-
Figure  18. Ph.  D. Personnel  (Full-Time),  Field of  Activity (all  respondents,
percent  distribution)
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Figure  19: Ph.  D. Personnel  (Part.  Time),  Field of Activity (all respondents,  perCEint
distribution)
ganized into  an Institute  of Science  and placed under the Office of the Presi-
dent. Despite these changes, its  impact on the  economy  was marginal.  The
Institute  suffered from lack of support, planning,  and coordination.  In fact,
the Bell Mission's Recommendation specifically stated that the Institute  had
no capability  to support S&T development for lack of basic information,  ne-
glect of experimentation and small budget for R&D activities.
Major shifts  in the 1950s and 1960s  focused on S&T institutional  capac-
ity building.  This was done through the establishment of infrastructure-sup-
port facilities  like  new research  agencies,  and manpower development. Again,
the effects were not significant.  The usual problems of lack of coordination
and planning,  especially in technology, prevented the system from perform-
ing effectively its functions. This was evident in the unplanned  activities  of
the researchers within  the agencies, who, on their own, looked for technolo-
gies and scientific breakthroughs that were commercially  viable. Without clear
research  directions, researches  were done for their own sake, leaving to chance
the commercialization of the output.
In response to these problems and the need to generate S&T products
and processes that  would be beneficial to the country, focus was redirected
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toward  applied  research in the 1970s. Furthermore,  in the 1980s, research
utilization  was given stronger emphasis. This led to the reorganization of the
bureau into the National  Science  and Technology Authority  (NSTA) in 1982.
The NSTA,  which had  eight R&D  institutes  and support agencies, was in-
tended to address the need for an effective and efficient utilization  of the re-
sults of R&D activities  through  greater commercialization  of outputs.  A sig-
nificant innovation under the reorganization  was the creation of the S&T council
system, which was responsible for the sectoral formulation of policy and strat-
egies and allocation of funds. There were four councils under the system: the
Philippine  Council for Health  Research  and Development (PCHRD), Philip-
pine Council for Industry  and Energy Research  and Development (PCIERD),
Philippine  Council for Agriculture,  Forestry, and Natural Resources  Research
and Development (PCARRD), and the National  Research  Council of the Phil-
ippines (NRCP). Later, the NRCP was replaced by the Philippine  Council for
Aquatic  and Marine  Research and Development (PCAMRD) and the Philip-
pine  Council for Advanced Science and Technology Research and Develop-
ment (pCASTRD).
In the mid-1980s, the regional offices for S&T promotion and extension
were established to further  hasten the development of S&T. There was also
a conscious effort to assist and encourage the local inventors  through insti-
tution  building  and support measures. A national  center for excellence for
the basic sciences was established in the  University  of the Philippines.  As
well, the scientific  career system was created to attract scientists to a career
path that would professionalize and upgrade the status of scientists. Further-
more, institutional  frameworks  were organized to  strengthen  the linkages
between the academe  and the private  sector.
Thus, the creation of the councils and research  institutes  under the NSTA
showed a clear shift  in S&T policy from being "technology push-oriented"  to
one that  was based on the "demand-pull"  strategy, where user and market
demand served as the basis for conducting R&D/S&T programs. Thus, scien-
tists  and researchers were placed under R&D programs deemed  to have high
demand potentials.
Mer  the EDSARevolution in 1986,  the NSTA was reorganized  into what is
now called the Department of Science  and Technology  (DOST) by virtue  of Ex-
ecutive Order 128. The DOST, being headed by a Cabinet Secretary, was man-
dated to provide overall direction for all S&T efforts by formulating and imple-
menting policies,  plans, programs and projects  geared  toward S&T development.
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further  restructured  through the  establishment of the  Technology Applica-
tion and Promotion Institute  (TAPI), its  implementing  arm that would push
for the  commercialization  of technologies and marketing  of the  technology
sefvices of other operating agencies of the department.  In addition,  the Sci-
ence Education Institute  (SEI) was set up to formulate  plans for the devel-
opment of S&T education and training.  Moreover, the Science and Technol-
ogy Information  Institute  (STII) was established to serve as the information
arm of the department through the development and maintenance of an S&T
data bank and information  networks.
The National  Institute  of Science and Technology was reorganized into
the  present Industrial  Technology Development Institute  to undertake  ap-
plied R&D,  transfer  R&D results to end-users, and provide technical, advi-
sory and consultancy services in the fields of industrial  manufacturing,  min-
eral processing, and energy. Entry into  the advanced technology areas was
formalized  with the creation of the Advanced Science and Technology Insti-
tute (ASTI). In line with this, additional S&T councils, namely, the PCASTRD
and the PCAMRD, were created to further  strengthen the Council system.
Furthermore,  the  DOST reinforced massive technology transfer  activi-
ties. Specific interventions  were initiated  through various programs such as
the Comprehensive Technology Transfer aqd Commercialization (CTTC) pro-
gram. The CTTC was intended to serve as a mechanism for identifying  and
pushing concrete results  of R&D toward productive application.  The initial
phase of the program that covered the period  1989 to 1992 included a num-
ber of technologies  whose  utilization was envisioned  to create substantial impact
on the national  socioeconomic  development process  and on the lives of many
Filipinos,  in general. The program covered areas such as financing,  technol-
ogypackages and training  centers.
In most R&D institutes, technology  transfer units were established  to carry
out the added responsibility  of transferring  completed researches. Provincial
S&T centers were established to help ensure the  efficient  transfer  of tech-
nologies to the provinces. S&T services  were also provided to supplement R&D
and technology  transfer.  Such  services  included the upgrading of testing, stan-
dardization  and quality  control services as well as various forms of technical
assistance and consulting services.  Assistance to investors was also provided.
This consisted of patenting assistance for inventions  with  commercial poten-
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tials;  assistance in the availment of financing for commercially viable inven-
tions; marketing assistance; support to pilot-plant operations for selected  top-
priority  technologies for commercialization;  and support to the upgrading of
inventions,  expertise and capabilities.
R&D institutes undertook contract researches  to foster collaboration among
the institutes,  the private sector, and the academe.  Furthermore,  funding as-
sistance to technology developers through tie-ups with  financing institutions
like the Development Bank of the Philippines, Technology  Livelihood Resource
Center, Land Bank, and Private  Development Corporation of the Philippines
was also initiated.
Incentives  were provided  under the  Omnibus  Investment  Law for cer-
tain R&D and S&T activities  in the private  sector. Some of the major incen-
tives included income tax holiday; duty-free importation of capital equipment;
deduction  from taxable income  for the acquisition of the necessary  infrastructure
and facilities  in less developed areas; access  to bonded manufacturing/trad-
ing warehouse system; and permission to employ foreign experts.
To facilitate  the  transfer  of foreign technology, science parks  were set
up. These parks  were also intended  to serve as the vehicles for university
interaction  with private industry;  to develop new knowledge-based  industries
and  strengthen  existing ones; and to provide a propitious  environment  for
innovation  and contract research. Moreover, technology business incubators
were initiated  in certain areas to assist the transfer  and commercializatiQn
of technologies by helping ensure the survival  and successful growth of new
technology firms  by providing  them with  appropriate  marketing,  financial,
technical and management assistance.
A presidential  task force on S&T was formed in 1988, specifically to deal
with the overall problems  confronting R&D and S&T development  in the country
and to formulate  an S&T development plan that would support the national
development  goal of attaining a newly-industrializing-country status by the year
2000. The task force  was composed  of the DOST, Department of  Agricultre  (DA),
Department of Trade and Industry  (DTI), Department of Transportation  and
Communications (DOTC), the Presidential Adviser on Public Resources,  and
three academic  institutions  directly involved in S&T. In March 1989  the task
force submitted a report to the President on the development  of 15 leading edges
to steer the country to industrial  development.  These  were (1) aquaculture and
(2) marine fisheries,  (3) forestry and (4) natural  resources, (5) process  indus-
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Table  38. Summary  of Science  and Technology  Policies  by Strategy
1. Modernization  of Production  Sectors
1.1  ~neration and  active  diffusion  of  employment-oriented  and  high  value-added technologies
1.2  Emphasis  on developmental  R&D  toward  commercialization
1.3  Proper  selection  and  acquisition  of  essential  and  appropriate  technologies.
1.4  Adaptation,  absorption  and  mastery  of imported  technologies
1.5  Dissemination  of  appropriate  technologies
1.6  Increasing  accessibility  to S&T  information  and  services
1.7  Reducing  environmental  degradation  and  mitigating  adverse  impacts  of  natural  hazards
2. Upgrading  of R&D  Activities
2.1  Establishing  R&D  priorities
2.2  Development  of  local  materials  and  indigenous  technologies
2.3  Stimulation  of private  sector  participation
2.4  Reducing  environmental  degradation  and  mitigating  Adverse  impacts  of  natural  hazards
3.  Development  of  S&T  Infrastructure
3.1  Development  of high-quality  S&T  manpower  in growth  areas
3.2  Expansion  of  S&T  education  and  training
3.3  Development  of  S&T  institutions
3.4  Development  of  an  S&  T culture
Source:  Eclar,  1991
Table  39.  Summary  of Science  and Technology  Policy  Programs  in the Philippine:s
Policy  and Program Brief Description
Modernization  of  the  production  sectors  The  CTTC  serves  as a mechanism  to link technology
.generators  and  users. It aims  to hasten  the process  of A  Compreh~n~lve.  Technology  Transfer  and  industrialization  through  commercialization  of technolo-
Commercialization  Program  (CTTC)  gies  whose  utilization  is  envisioned.
8  Support  programs  to the  CTTC
8-1  Production  of  technology  packages  Provision  of  info  and  economic  feasibility  studies
8-2  Investors'  fora  Venues  for  technology  generators
8-3  National  and  regional  technology  fairs  Organized  to showcase  new  technologies  for transfer
8-4  Technology  financing  programs  Funding  assistance  to technology
8-5  Information  services  Information  packages  on mature  technologies
8-6  DOST  training  centers  Conduct  technology  training
8-7  Regional  and  provincial  S&  T centers  Ensure  the  transfer  of  technologies
8-8  DOST  Academy  Technology  8usiness  Link  between  DOST  and  the academe  for technology
Entrepreneurship  Development  commercialization
Program
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Table  39  continued
C Technology  business  incubators  Assist  new  technology  firms  through  technical,
financial,  and  marketing  assistance
D Science  and  technology  parks
E  Global  search  for technology
F  Program  of  assistance  to investors
Facilitates  the  transfer  of  university-industry
interaction  in advanced  technology
Search  and  acquisition  of  commercial  technologies  abroad
Assistance  in patenting,  financing,  and  marketing
~
2  Upgrading  of  R&D  activities
A R&D Priority Plan (export winners, basic  Indication  of  preferred  areas  of  R&D
domestic  needs,  and  coconut  industry)
B  Grant-in  aids  program  Support  of  R&D  activities
C  Contract  research  program  Sponsored  research  with  other  agencies
0  R&D  incentive  programs  Incentives  for  the conduct  of  R&D  activities
3  Development  of R&D  infrastructure-  Graduate  and undergrad  scholarship  program  in  priority
areas
A  Manpower  Development  Program  in  Science  Dev't of the grade school  network  serving  as feeder
and  Engineering  schools  for  HS and  technical  schools
B  Grade  school  and  secondary  school  level  Dev't  of vocational  and  technical  schools  in the industri-
C . d h . I d .alizing  areas
Vocational an  tec  nlca e  ucatlon
D Scientific  Career  System  (SCS)  Career  path  for scientists  that  will develop  their  technical
expertise
E  Utilization  of  Filipino  professionals  and  workers  Employment  of Filipino  expatriates
F  Recognition  of  S&  T efforts  Conferment  of  the  rank  and  title  of National  Scientists
G  Balik-scientist  program  Taking  advantage  of trained  Filipino  scientists  and  engi-
neers  through  information  exchange
H  Development  of  S&  T culture  Promotion  of science  consciousness  and  innovativeness
I  Organizing  and  strengthening  of S&T  networks  Strengthening  of S&T sectoral  network  and establish-
and  institutions  ment  of  new  S&T  institutions  and  mechanisms
aptation and use. S&T development  also suffers from underinvestment in terms
of manpower training,  technological servicing, R&D facilities,  and financial
resources.
The weak linkage can be attributed  to (a) slow commercialization of tech-
nologies due to a weak delivery system; (b) poor linkages between S&T orga-
nizations and industry  and other government agencies;  and (c) low apprecia-
tionof R&D due to the short-term  perspective  of private and government  agencies.
To identify  ways of improving the  delivery system and the commercial-
ization of R&D output,  Eclar (1991)  investigated some  of the underlying fac-
tors behind such an improvement. One of these was user participation.  This
~eans that successful  commercialization  is promoted  when a user with a specific
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need has been identified  at the start  of the project. The user generally  maintains
an  interest  in the  progress  of the  research  and  takes  on the  commercializa-
tion  of the  results  at the  completion  of the  research  project  to  meet his  pre-
viously  identified  need. This  is reinforced  when the user's interest  in the  project
is translated  into  support  or  cost sharing.  Another  important  factor  identi-
fied  by the  study  was  pilot  testing.  Demonstration  of the  technical  viability
of the  technology  in a semi-commercial  scale helps  convince  an industry  user
to start  off commercialization.  Commercial  success is promoted  when the  user
himself,has  provided  material  inputs  to the  pilot  test.
In  spite  of the  express  importance  of  S&T  and  R&D  development  in the
Philippines  and  th~  series  of well-intentioned  strategies,  the  state  of  S&T
and  R&D  development  remains  far  behind  those  of other  Asian  countries  by
any measure.  One  reason  behind  this  is the  low private  sector  participation
in  R&D  activities.  Most  developed  countries  boast  of  a  healthy  R&D  part-
nership  between  the  public  and private  sectors.  For instance,  the  bulk  of R&D
expenditure  that  originates  from  the  private  sector  in  Japan  is  83 percent,
Korea  82 percent,  Taiwan  65 percent,  Singapore  62 percent,  and  Thailand
40 percent.  Contrast  these  with  the  Philippines'  measly  20 percent  from  the
private  sector,  or even less.
Aside  from  underinvestment  in R&D,  the  Philippines  also  suffers  from
the  shortage  of  S&T  manpower.  For  lack  of good employment  opportunities
in  the  domestic  economy,  braindrain  of technical  personnel  as well  as  S&T
professionals  results.  In  1992 the  Philippines  had  only  15,610  personnel  en-
gaged in R&Dactivities,  representing  152 individuals  per  million  population.
The UNESCO  puts  the  critical  mass of S&T  personnel  at 380 per million  popu-
lation  to facilitate  the  application  of technology.
The  STMP  and  STAND  2000 have  too  many  identified  areas  to  support
with  too little  financial  resources. One wonders  how much  attention  was  given
to the  consideration  of the  viability  of their  implementation.  This  is  in  view
of the  weak linkage  between  planning  and budgeting,  and little  consideration
for  budget  availability  in the  plan  formula~on  stage.  With  insufficient  bud-
get allocation,  the  DOST  either  had  to  cancel  or to reduce  its  financial  sup-
port  for  specific  S&T  development  programs  and projects.
R&D  is crucial  in a country's  development process, yet some economic agents
are hesitant  to pursue  it because of the  high  risks  involved  in R&D  activities,
particularly  the  uncertain  outcomes  of certain  R&D  undertakings.  Then,  too,
there  is the  high  incidence  of spillover  or externality,  which  is hard  to appro-
k
81Technological  Innovation in Japan and  S&T Experiences  in the  Philippines  c
priate. Thus, to push R&D activities to the frontier,  government interventions
are critical.  But the formulation of the type of government intervention needed
is a delicate thing  to do, and oftentimes controversial, because  of imperfect
information.  Wrong policy formulation could put to waste limited  government
resources. However,.the experiences of Korea and Taiwan show that  proper
targeting of industries and tailor fitting  of R&D incentive structure could work
very well if accompanied  by a sound human resource  development. In fact, co-
ordination in these two areas and implementation of a good  program for a con-
tinuous manpower training and development  have propelled and sustained the
economic  growth of these two Asian countries.
Poor coordination and lack of coordinated planning  in relation  to R&D
are two other major problems confronting the innovation and technology sector
in the country.  In various  government departments  and agencies, surveys
:Ind interviews  indicate a seemingly chaotic and confusing system of institu-
tional arrangements for lack of focus on strategic sectors and programs. Fur-
thermore, as Magpantay (1995)  argues,  the DOST system  has become  so com-
plex, having expanded its size way beyond its ability to perform its functions
effectively.  The Department  is doing a lot of unfocused and ill-planned  ac-
tivities  through its  different  councils and institutions.  Certainly,  this  leads
to  institutional  inefficiencies.  A reorganization  of the structure  of the  De-
partment is therefore required.
R&D  Gaps  in the  Philippines
The poor productivity performance  in the Philippines, as highlighted above,
is due largely to the gaps in R&D. There are national as well as sectoral gaps
in terms of expenditure, budget, and manpower.
Gaps  at the national level.  Based  on an econometric  study, Cororaton (1999)
estimates the magnitude  of R&D gaps at the  national  level. R&D  gaps are
defined as those factors that have prevented the economy  from operating to
the fullest  in terms of productivity.  These factors could be either in the form
of (a) low R&D investments and inadequate R&D manpower; (b) institutional
weaknesses  as a result of poor system, management  and leadership; (c) policy
lapses and failures;  or all three combined. But  in the estimation,  only the
first  two have been  considered because  of insufficiency of data.
The results indicate  that the resulting  R&D expenditure  gap is 0.5778.
This means that the R&D  expenditure-GNP ratio would have to increase by
0.5778 for the Philippine  TFP to reach the TFP frontier.  The average R&D
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expenditure-GNP ratio  during the 1980s  was 0.1667 percent. Thus the total
R&D  expenditure-GNP ratio  needed  to reach the frontier  is 0.1667 + 0.5778
= 0.7445. This is a sizeable increase from the current  level, but  lower than
what has been  proposed in S&T Bill (House Bill No. 2214)-1  percent of GNP.
Applying  this  ratio  to the  1997 GNP of P2,527 billion  will  yield  a total
R&D expenditure of roughly P18.8 billion.  This R&D investment  gap is sub-
stantial,  considering that the present level of R&D spending is approximately
P3 billion.  It is also impossible for the government to fill  this  gap because of
the budgetary impact that  it is likely to create.
The government, though, has other equally important and pressing needs,
especially in the area of basic infrastructure  like  market Toads,  bridges and
port, and of social sectors like  education and health. Furthermore,  it  may be
totally  inefficient  to reallocate limited  government resources to R&D activi-
ties because of the institutional  inefficiencies in the R&D  system as well as
in the S&T structure.  David et al. (1999), for example, argues that while ag-
ricultural  research continues to be underfunded,  "efficiency of public  sector
research funding has been significantly  lowered by the misallocation  of lim-
ited  budgetary resources, as well as by institutional  weaknesses  of the agri-
cultural  research system." Thus, unless these institutional  weaknesses are
addressed, additional  government funding into R&D will  only go to waste.
In some progressive countries, the bulk  of R&D  investment comes from
the private  sector. The challenge therefore is how to encourage the private
sector to participate  in R&D  activities.  It  is also important  to  identify  the
necessary infrastructure,  incentive  system and investment safeguards that
will  enable the said sector to do its own R&D.
In terms of manpower, it was observed that the  gap is around  197 sci-
entists and engineers per million population. The average ratio for the 1980s
was only 108. For the Philippine  TFP to reach the gap, it needs R&D man-
power (108 + 197  = 305) per million population.
Sectoral gaps and problems. Technology-related issues and problems are
generally  similar  across sectors. They largely focus on four major problems:
(a) underinvestment in R&D; (b) lack of adequate  and technically capable  R&D
manpower;  (c) institutional  weaknesses; and (d) policy failures.  Below is a
brief discussion on the following sectors: agriculture,  fishery, manufacturing,
education, and health.
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Table  41. Distribution  of Public Expenditures  for Agriculture  and Natural  Resources
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Source:  David  et  al., 1999
lack of accountability,  fragmentation  of research, incentive problems, insta-
bility  in leadership, and weak linkage between research and extension.
Misallocation  of research resources. Using the congruence rule,  which
defines the optimal  research resource allocation across commodity program
areas as proportional  to the respective commodity value-added or value  of
production  shares (in other words, given a total  budget for agricultural  re-
search, the  research intensity  ratio,  i.e., research expenditure  as a ratio  of
the value-added, should be equal across commodity research program areas),
David  et al. (1999) have found that the "allocation of research expenditures
across commodities and regions has been highly  incongruent  to their  rela-
tive economic  measured in terms of gross  value-added contribution of the com-
modity." They add that "in particular,  relatively  greater research  budgets are
provided for minor commodities such  as cotton, silk and carabao,  and too little
to major ones such as corn, coconut, and fisheries. Furthermore,  Mindanao
regions ar~ relatively  neglected in terms  of research budgets of the  DA and
SUCs compared to regions in  Luzon and to a lesser extent to those in the
Visayas." "While congruency," they say, "does not strictly  coincide with opti-
mal research resources allocation,  the differences in research intensity  ra-
tios observed among commodities and across  regions cannot be explained by
possible differences  in  cost research (probability  of research success,  etc.),
future  market potential  nor equity considerations."
David et al. (1999) identify  other indications of misallocation of resources
and institutional  weaknesses in agricultural  research, namely:
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(1)  Overly high  share of personal salaries. Personal salaries (PS) on the
average tend to be disproportionately  high at 58 percent, while maintenance
and other operating expenses (MOOE) make up about 36 percent and capi-
tal outlays  (CO) only 6 percent of the  total expenditure  for agricultural  re-
search. In  more developed countries, where salary rates are much higher,
the  distribution  of expenditures  is 40 percent for PS, 40 percent for MaE,
and 20 percent for CO.
Generally,  in almost all research agencies in the Philippines,  the shares
of PS are high; at least 50  percent. In a number of commodity research  agencies
and SUCs, the shares can be as high as 70 to 80 percent. PhilRice, however,
is  an exception. The structure  of expenditure  is  40 percent for PS, 50 per-
cent for MaE,  and 10 percent for CO. This allows for a more efficient utili-
zation of its  manpower and physical facilities,  as well as promotes more sys-
tematic and long-term research planning.
UP Los Banos, which undertakes the  bulk  of agriculture  research, has
also the same expenditure  structure,  with  PS share as high as 70 percent.
Moreover, research projects under the  different  institutes,  centers, and re-
search units  of the university  are primarily  driven by the priorities  of exter-
nal donors, who contribute  about half of the research funding.  As such, the
effectiveness of research is constrained by uncertain and short-term  nature
of funding,  even though the university  may have the most capable scientists
in the country in different fields in agriculture.
The overly high share of PS in the Philippines  may reflect overstaffing,
bureaucratic rigidities  and poor planning.
(2)  Unfocused  projects. An analysis of the work and financial  plans and
projects that have been completed in the Philippines  indicates that  research
projects are highly fragmented and short-term  in nature.  Research  findings
and outputs are not carried to future researches  or used for extension  to benefit
the clientele.  This  is because there  is no adequate system or clear mecha-
nism whereby research findings  are fully transferred  to the targeted end-us-
ers. Also, there  are no system~ where researches are continued  on a long-
term and continuous basis. Thus, generally,  research projects are not prob-
lem-oriented.
(3)  Absence  of clear networks  among BUGs.  Ponce  (1998)  argues that SUCs
are basically  "independent from each other despite their  hierarchical  desig-
nations as national  multi-commodity  research centers, regional research sta-
tions, and cooperating stations. The national  multi-commodity  research cen-
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ters' (UPLB,  Central  Luzon State University,  Visayas State College of Agri-
culture,  and University  of Southern Mindanao) linkage  to the  regional and
cooperating stations  are ad hoc in character, and project-related.  There ex-
ists no institutionalized  linkage  resulting  from clearly defined complemen-
tary functions."
(4) Absence of a clear network  between DA and  its  attached  agencies.
Ponce (1998) also argues that  the DA research system consists of national
experiment  stations  operated  by  (a) various  bureaus  such as Bureau  of
Plant Industry,  Bureau of Animal Industry,  Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources,  and Bureau of Soils and Water Management  (BSWM); (b) attached
agencies such as PhiRice, Philippine  Carabao Center, Philippine  Coconut
Authority,  Sugar  Regulatory  Administration,  and  Fiber  Industry  Devel-
opment Authority;  (c) regional  integrated  centers  under the  regional  of-
fices of the DA; and (d) regional outreach stations. As with the SUCs, "there
exists  no clear  functional  delineation  between the  national  stations  and
the  regional  experiment  stations,  and between the  regional  and the  pro-
visional  stations.  Each station exists independently  of each other in terms
of programs,  even within  the  DA proper.  Thus,  national  centers  do not
exactly  orchestrate  the  national  research and  development  programs  of
their  assigned commodities."
(5)  Absence  of a clear linkage with  the private  sector.  Ponce (1998) also
cites the weak linkage  between the private  sector and the larger community
of research stations. Most private  research centers exist principally  to meet
the needs of the companies that established them. As such, they do not inter-
act with the rest of the research  community, dominated essentially by the gov-
ernment sector, except for a few privately operated research centers that per-
form public services such as the Twin Rivers Research  Center. There is also
no mechanism whereby this link could be fostered.
(6) Other institutional  gaps. Other institutional  weaknesses  cited by Ponce
(1998)  are (a) the lack of well-defined and institutionalized  mechanism for col-
laboration among  R&D subsystems;  and (b)  the inefficient funding system and
lack of accountability.  The present funding  system is still  very much like the
old project-approach one, where research  outputs are essentially in the forms
of research reports. This weakens the system of program approach and leads
to the  distortion  of national priorities.  Furthermore, the present funding ap-
proach  gives  rise to a much-djffused  structure of research  implementation where
responsibility is difficult  to pinpoint.
87Manpower gaps. In terms of R&D manpower  profile in agriculture, the au-
thors find  that the problem is not in terms of number but in the relatively  low
level of scientific qualification  of the agriculture  research system. This is par-
ticularly  true  in both the DA and the Department of Environment and Natu-
ral Resources  (DENR) research  agencies.  The very low ratios of technical man-
power resources with  advanced degrees at the DA and DENR does not com-
pare quite favorably with similar institutions  in some  Asian countries like Ma-
laysia, Indonesia, and even  Bangladesh.
On the other hand, the quality of research manpower in SUCs is not uni-
formlyor  always significantly better. Although the share of manpower in SUCs
may be higher than  in agencies,  there is a big and worsening problem of in-
breeding. Furthermore,  local scientists who were trained and educated abroad
are not generally  attuned to recent developments  or frontier international knowl-
edge.  Also, there is a big gap in the quality of faculties and researchers  in UPLB
and other SUCs.
Fisheries  Sector14
This sector is important  not only because  it has direct impact on national
health and nutrition  (i.e., fish is the source of about 75 percent of the  total
animal protein requirement of the country, or more than poultry and livestock
combined), but also because  its structure,  particularly  on the  supply side, is
directly  affected by what has been happening in the environment. To a cer-
tain extent, the fisheries sector can be one output indicator of what has been
happening in the environment.
Israel (1999) points out that the weak performance of the fisheries sector
has been the  result of several interrelated  problems, the  top three of which
are (a) resource depletion in coastal  waters due to overfishing and destructive
fishing,  as manifested by the deterioration of important  fish stocks and spe-
cies and the degradation of ecosystems;  (b) large-scale environmental damage,
as evidenced by the destruction of coral reefs and mangroves in marine areas
and the pollution  of major river lakes; and (c) proliferation  of industrial,  agri-
cultural,  commercial, and domestic activities,  which discharge pollutants  into
marine waters, contributing  to the deterioration of ecosystems  and rendering
marine food potentially  harmful  for consumption.
'4  Based  on  the  paper  of  Israel,  1999
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R&D is important  to the development of the fisheries sector, particularly
to its  long-term survival.  Primarily,  R&D is crucial to generating new infor-
mation and technologies that  can increase output above the current  low and
dwindling levels.  The responsibility of managing  and coordinating  fisheries R&D
in the Philippines  has been the task of the PCAMRD. The Council, which is
under the DOST, is tasked to plan, monitor, as well evaluate fisheries R&D.
The paper of Israel (1999)  discusses  the R&D structure  of the fisheries sector.
Furthermore,  PCAMRD interacts  with two government agencies  whose R&D
scope  covers the fisheries sector. These agencies are the  Bureau of Agricul-
tural Research  (BAR) of the DA and the Ecosystem  Research  and Development
Bureau (ERDB) of the DENR. They are mandated to coordinate all researches
of the regional offices and line agencies within  their respective departments.
The BAR covers  fisheries research  because  fisheries are administratively  clas-
sified under the agricultural  sector.  The ERDB does  so since aquatic resources
form part of the natural resource  base  and therefore falls under DENR.
Institutional  gap and issues.  Israel (1999) has found that one of the big-
gest  gaps which results from the present institutional  arrangement is the weak
coordination and poor collaboration among government  agencies.  As stated, the
PCAMRD is the agency  tasked to manage  and coordinate overall fisheries R&D
while the BAR and the ERDB coordinate fisheries research  of the regional of-
fices and line  agencies of their respective departments. Because of the simi-
larity  in functions and constituency, potential overlapping was observed  to ex-
ist among  the three agencies.  To address  this problem, the agencies  delineated
their functions by drawing up Memoranda of Agreements (MOAs). Implemen-
tation of these agreements,  however,  has been  hampered by poor collaboration.
In particular,  in violation  of the MOAs, the agencies do not actually  jointly
review all research proposals submitted for funding. Furthermore,  collabora-
tion is weak or lacking in several activities and strong only in one aspect.
Aside from poor collaboration, another crucial institutional  problem deals
with a possible duplication of tasks between PCAMRD and BF  AR arising from
the  existing Fisheries Code. The Code reconstituted  the  BFAR from a staff
to a line  bureau under the  DA and assigned it the  function  ot formulating
and implementing a Comprehensive Fishery Research  and Development Pro-
gram. To effect this  program, the  law created a new agency within  BFAR,
the  National  Fisheries  Research and Development Institute  (NFRDI) as its
main  research arm.  Among the functions  of this  agency are the  establish-
ment of a national infrastructure  that will facilitate,  monitor, and implement
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various  research activities  of the  fisheries  sector; and the  establishment,
strengthening,  and expansion of a network of fisheries-related  communities
through effective communication linkages nationwide. These functions of the
BFAR and the NFRDI  may duplicate those of the PCAMRD.  For one, the re-
sponsibilities  of formulating  and implementing  an overall plan for fisheries
R&D  and coordinating  its  implementation  are the mandates of the council.
For another, the  Council has already established a network  of research in-
stitutions,  the  National  Aquatic  Resources Research and Development Sys-
tems, to serve as an implementing  arm for fisheries R&D.  At a larger scale,
the duplication of functions  in the R&D programs in the fishery and agricul-
ture sectors has been noted by the Agricultural  Commission.
The issue of which agency and department should manage, coordinate,
and implement R&D has been a long-running  one. At present, this  question
is far from settled and creates a lot of bureaucratic  and institutional  ineffi-
ciencies.
Capability issues.  Capability issues surrounding R&D in fisheries include
(a) low investment (including public, private, as well as foreign investments);
(b) funding problems such as their  untimely  release; (c) manpower shortage;
and (d) poor maintenance of existing capital.
(a) Low public  investment. The most glaring resource-related problem in
R&D is historically  low government funding  that agriculture  as a whole re-
ceives (Tables 42 and 43). In developed  countries, the average public invest-
ment in agriculture  R&D is about 2 percent of their  agricultural  gross value
added (GV  A).  In contrast,  only about 0.019 percent of GV  A is allocated 10.
cally. The Philippines  has the lowest R&D allocation for agriculture  in Asia.
For fisheries,  in particular,  allocation averages only about 0.102 percent
of fisheries value-added, which is close to what agriculture  is getting.  How-
ever, the fisheries R&D  budget is only about 3.6 percent of the total expen-
diture  for agriculture  and natural  resources  R&D combined. Thus, compared
to agriculture  and natural  resources,  the fisheries sector is getting the worst
end of the deal in the sharing of government funds.
A look at disaggregate data indicates  not only low government funding
for fisheries R&D  but also an uheven government allocation among institu-
tions. In 1996, among the.NARRDS members, the budget as ratios to the to-
tal  number of researchers and projects differed widely (Tables 44 and 45). It
can be seen also that the ratios  of budget to the number of researchers and
projects were low for many institutions,  including some zonal centers.
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Table  42.  Public Expenditures  for R&D  in Agriculture  and Natural  Resources,  Grolss
Value.added  in Agriculture,  including  Fishery  and  Forestry,  and Research
Intensity  Ratios  (RIR),  1992.1996
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Research  expenditures  (P million)'




















303,415 355,612 392,954 449,080 2. Gross value-added  (P million) 281,748





















.Refers  to direct  budgetary  outlay.  Figures  in parentheses  refer  to total  research  expenditure,  including  external
grants  from  local  and  foreign  sources.
Source:  Israel,  1999
Table  43. Public Expenditures  for R&D  in  Agriculture,  Natural  Resources,  and
Related  Environmental  Issues  (in million pesos)
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Table  43. continued
To address the problem of low budget for agriculture  and fisheries R&D,
the Agriculture  and Fisheries Modernization  Act stipulated  that allocations
be increased to at least 1 percent of GV  A by the year 2001. For its part,  the
Fisheries Code legislated the creation of a special fund  for fisheries R&D  in
the  initial  amount of P100 million.  The AFMA  is mute  regarding the shar-
ing of funds between agriculture  and fisheries. Assuming that  allocation will
be proportionate to output contribution,  the budget for fisheries should jump
substantially  from its  current  levels. It is doubtful  whether the planned in-
creases in allocations  will  fully  materialize  soon given the  mounting  fiscal
deficits.
Low nrivate  investment.  Data  on private  investment  in fisheries  R&D
are scarce. This is understandable  given the natural  aversion of the private
sector to  divulging  information.  This  notwithstanding,  private  entities  are
known to have been involved, one way or another, in R&D, especially in ap-
plied  research and technology verification  activities,  where the likelihood  of
generating new technologies for immediate commercial application is high.
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A lot of the private  sector involvement  in fisheries R&D is in aquacul-
ture. During the rapid development  of this industry in the last 20  years, private
firms  have been collaborating  with  national  institutions  and locally based
international  research agencies in the conduct of applied research, covering
many commodities including  prawn, tilapia,  milkfish,  crab, and other com-
mercially profitable  species.
In  the  commercial  fisheries,  private  sector participation  in  R&D  is
limited  since research in capture technologies usually  requires  larger  in-
vestments  and results  are difficult  to patent.  Also,  many research activi-
ties, such as stock and resource assessments, have social externalities  that
go beyond the  interests  of private  operators  and thus  are better  left  to
government and international  research agencies to conduct. The common
practice  in the  commercial  fisheries  has been to use imported  technolo-
gies outright  or modify  to some extent  said technologies to  suit  local re-
quirements  and needs.
In the municipal fisheries, private  investment in monetary terms is low
because  of the poor economic  condition of the municipal fishermen. However,
manpower involvement  in R&D is  substantial  among fishermen  and their
families,  as seen in their  participation  in the  conduct of numerous coastal
resource management and similar  projects undertaken  by government and
interjiational  agencies.
Available data show that the share of private investment in fisheries R&D
is low (Table 46). To promote this type of investment, the-AFMA encourages
government research agencies to go into  co-financing agreements with  the
private  sector, provided that the terms and conditions of the agreements are
beneficial to the country.  For reasons already cited, the possibility  of these
agreements actually happening will be higher in aquaculture than in the com-
mercial and fisheries subsectors.
Low foreign investment. Figures show that between 1988 and 1994,  for-
eign funding  for fisheries R&D comprised more than half of the total fund-
ing (Table 46). In  recent years, however, this  share has gone down (Table
47). By 1996, only 7 percent of the total funds ofNARRDS  institutions  came
from foreign sources  (Table 49).  Furthermore, funding was concentrated only
in a few areas, mostly the environment and other priority  areas.
Foreign fundi~  is important because  it is essentially a signaling mecha-
nism.  Low outside investment  for domestic R&D could mean that  local re-
search institutions  and their  programs are not internationally  competitive
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Table  46.  R&D  Expenditures  for Fisheries  by  Sector  and  Source  of  Funds, 1988.1994
(in million pesos)
Table  47. R&D  Expenditures  for Fisheries  of Selected  NARRDS  Institutions,  by Source
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Source:  Cororaton  et  al.,  2000
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and vice versa. Furthermore,  in this  time of economic crisis,  foreign money
may be the only viable  way of increasing allocations. Be that  as it may, the
AFMA  and Fisheries Code do not address the issue of international  funding
for R&D.
(b) Untimely release  of funds. A commonly cited fund-related  problem in
fisheries  R&D  is the  untimely  release of government funds to institutions,
programs, and projects. In fact, this  constraint is true  not only for R&D  but
also for other activities  dependent on government support. In fisheries,  it is
acute because of the importance of time and season in the conduct of activi-
ties. Although  there are no data that  can be used to validate  this,  research
activities  are reported to be cancelled or haphazardly conducted because of
delay in the release of funds. A review of the Fisheries Sector Program shows
other problems in the  management of government funds (Pacific Rim Inno-
vation  and Management Exports  Inc. and ANZDEC  Ltd.  1996), which has
implications  for fisheries R&D.  These include the excessive control  by the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) of a large proportion  of pro-
gram funds; the  diversion  of some funds to other activities  not necessarily
directly  related to the program; the  lack of coordination  between the DBM
and program administrators  regarding fund utilization;  and the lack of a fi-
nancial monitoring system.
(c) Shortage of manpower. Earlier  figures  show that the NARRDS insti-
tutions  have relatively  limited  R&D manpower at all levels (Table 48). They
also indicate  that  personnel capability  varies  greatly  between regions and
programs and that  senior personnel, especially those with doctorate degrees,
are concentrated in a few institutions  (Table 50). While the limited  number
of doctorate holders has been compensated, in some cases, by master's de-
gree holders,  it  cannot be denied that  more of the  former  are required  in
NARRDS institutions  to provide organizational and research leadership.
A comparison  of selected  NARRDS and National Agriculture and Resources
Research Development Network institutions  suggests that the manpower in
fisheries R&D is no more than 10 percent of that in agriculture  although the
percentage of Ph.D. holders is a bit  higher  (Table 51).  This  proportion  is
highly  uneven and not reflective  of the higher ratio of fisheries  output to to.
tal  agricultural  production (Table 52). Also, the graduate to undergraduate
ratio of fisheries R&D staff appears to be significantly  lower compared to that
of agriculture  also.
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Table  51. Comparison  of the Number  of R&D Personnel  in Selected  NARRDS  .ind





































Note: NARRDN  stands  for National  Agriculture  and  Natural  Resources  Research  and Development  Network,  the
counterpart  of NARRDS.  NARRDS  data are for 1996  while  NARRDN  data are  for 1995.  NARRDS  data are
specifically  for  fisheries  R&D  manpower  only.
Source:  Israel,  1999
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The problem of limited  manpower in fisheries R&D,  especially in insti-
tutions  located in the provinces, deserves attention  because of the rural  na-
ture of many fisheries activities. Researchers working in the countryside are
more exposed  to the actual problems in fisheries and are in a better position
to correctly identify  priority  research areas for implementation.  Thus, more
of them 'should be recruited  to enhance the  capability  of the  sector to con-
duct hands-on and meaningful,  not "ivory tower," research.
The Fisheries Code does not address the problem of limited  R&D  man-
power in fisheries. The AFMA, on the other hand, stipulates  the creation of
a science fund to sustain career development. Both the Code and AFMA ac-
knowledge that  manpower problem is directly  related to funding,  and thus
promise to increase the  total R&D allotment,  which, should they material-
ize, will  go a long way in addressing the problem.
(d) Low level and poor maintenance of capital assets.  While the data pre-
sented here relate only to funding and personnel  resources,  capital resources-
in particular,  buildings,  facilities,  and equipment-also  help determine the
success  or failure  of R&D.  In fisheries, the capital resources for R&D have
been wanting, more so in provincial institutions  which receive smaller shares
of the research budget. The problem of inadequate capital assets is worsened
further  by poor maintenance. There have been reports  that  proper mainte-
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such as salaries. In sites close to the sea, the faster deterioration  of capital
assets brought about by the presence  of salt makes the problem of poor main-
tenance very serious.
Like the manpower  problem, the inadequate and poor maintenance of capi-
tal  assets is a function  of funding.  If the NARRDS institutions  get higher
allocations,  they could purchase enough capital assets and spare money for
maintenance. Again, the solution rests a lot on the increased allocations prom-
ised by the AFMA and Fisheries Code.
Manufacturing
Tracking  down the developments in manufacturing  R&D is difficult  for
lack of historical  information,  which effectively prevented the study team to
assess  it thoroughly.  As mentioned in Section II,  the breakdown of R&D ex-
penditure that is available up until  1992  is entirely different from the sectoral
breakdown  in the Philippine  Standard  Industrial  Classification  (pSI C). As
such, historical  information  is  not consistent with  what is available  in the
National  Statistics  Office data system. This is a major hurdle  because R&D
activities, which usually come  in the form of investments and manpower avail-
ability,  are analyzed against the indicators  of sectoral output.  For example,
in the congruence rule  discussed in  Section III,  optimal  allocation  of R&D
budget should be proportional  to the respective commodity value-added or
value of production shares. While the latter  is available from the NSO data,
the former is not. However, David  et al. (1999), after a tedious task of gath-
ering and assembling information from almost all sectors in agriculture,  were
able to apply the analysis in a preliminary  way. Based on the analysis, they
were able to conclude that R&D  allocation in agriculture  is far from optimal.
However, the  same analysis  cannot apply to the  manufacturing  sector
for lack of R&D  data. What was done, instead" was to conduct a small sur-
vey (Macapanpan 1998 and Halos 1998) on selected industries  in the manu-
facturing sector, and company  interviews (Nolasco 1998)  within  those selected
industries,  including  the Board of Investments (BOI). The discussion here is
largely based on these papers.
The paper of Macapanpan (1998)  focuses on the Philippines'  private  sec-
tor innovation activities.  It was based on a survey of selected  companies from
five industry  groups: (1) food processing; (2) textile  and garments; (3) metals
and metal fabrication;  (4) chemicals; and (5) electronics and electrical  ma-
chinery. The major conclusions of the study, in his words, are the following:
101(a)  Only big firms do engage  themselves in innovation. These are indus-
try leaders. Smaller firms  may just be riding along, not following.
(b)  Innovation activities are perceived by the firms to improve their com-
petitiveness  through improved quality,  lower production costs, and
enhanced marketing performance. Government standards and regu-
lations and environmental concerns are not important  drivers of in-
novation activities. As predicted by the relevant literature  and studies,
firms  will  formulate  their  technology strategy to support their over-
all business strategy.
(c)  The steel industry  has not acquired any significant  new technology
despite recommendations from various studies. The same is true  for
the textile  industry,  which has fallen behind  in  modernizing  their
equipment to remain competitive, quality-  and cost-wise.
(d)  Of the total  respondent firms  (more than 60), only seven firms  em-
ploy Ph.Ds and only about 20  have master's  degrees.  A majority employ
only college graduates, or lower, in their  innovation  activities,  im-
plying a very low level of innovation activity.
(e)  Government research institutions  rank  very low as a source of in-
novation ideas. From interviews,  the perception of the firms  is that
these research institutions  lag even in monitoring  technology devel-
opments in their respective fields.  Internal  R&D is not relied upon,
except by the firms  in the electronics and electrical industry.  Ideas
for innovation  activities  are usually sourced from the outside in the
form of consultancy services; information on competitor activity  gen-
erated by monitoring; purchase of technology,  tangible and intangible;
and the recruitment  of manpower with the required skills.
(f)  Financial constraints  such as risk and rate of return,  lack of financ-
ing, and taxation are the major hindrances to innovation.  Technical
constraints such  as lack of information on new technologies,  deficiency
in external technical services, innovation costs,  and uncertainty  rank
next as barriers  to innovations. Others mentioned include  difficulty
in obtaining patents, low technological standards, lack of skilled per-
sonnel, and lack of opportunities  for cooperation with  other compa-
nies.
(g)  Philippine  firms are deficient in experience and organization to fully
exploit technology as a source of competitive advantage. This situa-
tion is not helped by the lack of government assistance and support.
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Government  has  been remiss  in  aligning  the  educational  system  with
a globally  and  technologically  competitive  economy. The requisite  tech-
nical  and  technological  skills  and  knowledge  are  lacking  in  Philip-
pine  schools. Government  research institutions  have  not diffused  their
findings  to the  private  sector.
Based  on a survey,  Macapanpan  (1998)  was  able  to  identify  major  gaps
and  stumbling  blocks to the private  sector's exploitation  of the benefits  of being
technologically  attuned  and  updated  productive  units.  Based  on interviews,
Nolasco  (1998) identified  other  gaps and  major  loopholes  in the  system:
(a)  The  overall  system  is  loose  and  chaotic  in  the  sense  that  different
government  agencies have  different  sets of priority  sectors.  Further-
more, some of the  goals are unaligned.  For example,  the  National  Eco-
nomic and Development  Authority  (NEDA),  DTI,  and BOI have varying
sets of strategic  sectors. The  Department  of Foreign Affairs  and  NEDA
have  conflicting  interests  with  the  BOI  industry  planners,  especially
in  granting  incentives.  In  particular,  the  Department  of  Energy  is
looking  into  the  possibility  of developing  wind  energy while  the  DOST
is  eyeing  the  solar energy.
(b)  Government,  with  a limited  budget  for  R&D,  limits  the  amount  of
expenditure  on R&D.
(c)  Support  facilities  like  testing  centers,  either  government-run  or sub-
sidized;  standardization  institution;  and  support  industries  like  cas-
ing and others  are  lacking  or non-existent.  Access to recent  and state-
of-the-art  technologies  is  lacking  due to  poor databases.
(d)  The  system  caters  only  to a handful  of fIrms,  usually  the  larger  ones.
Small  and  medium-scale  firms  have  minimum  access to the  system.
(e)  The  staff  assigned  to the  incentive  promotion  desk are  not too famil-
iar  with  the  system  of incentives.  For example,  some of them  are  not
even aware  of  (1) the  contents  of the  R&D  incentives  scheme  called
the  list  of Priority  Areas  (LOPA)  and  (2) that  R&D  incentives  have
existed  for more  than  six years.  Most  of them  would  recall  that  R&D
was integrated  into the Incentive  Promotion  Program  (IPP)-LOPA  only
in the  past two  years,  when  it has  been there  since  early  1991.
(f)  Government  and  private  sector  linkages  are  very  weak.  Thus,  com-
mercialization  of developed  technologies  has  not been well  promoted.
As  a result  of these  gaps and  problems,  only  11 companies,  or a total  of
13 projects,  were  granted  incentives  during  the  period  1991 to 1997.
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Meanwhile,  the results  of Halos's (1998) survey of and interviews  with
private  firms  in the chemical industries,  which produce chemical inputs  into
agriculture  (such as fertilizer  and pesticides), indicate  that there has been a
considerable reduction in R&D investments.  The exceptions are in the sugar
and coconut industries,  where research funds have been mandated by gov-
ernment.  In fact, the  intensity  of research activities  by the private  sector,
except sugarcane and coconut, appears to have declined from the 1980s  level.
Information  on R&D is scarce and hard to come  by, but there are clear indi-
cations of this  slowdown. For example, a number of multinational  pesticide
companies  used to maintain research  groups distinct from the marketing group,
but only two continue to do so today. The regional research station of a mul-
tinational  agrichemical firm  has reduced not only the  number (from five to
three) but also the  rank of its  research staff (from two  senior to two junior
level).
Halos (1998) also observes that the  government has adopted a policy of
promoting local innovations  and R&D activities.  This is manifested in a ma-
jor legislation,  Republic Act 7459, which was signed into  law in April  1992.
The law provides multi-incentives  package to encourage the development of
inventions  and facilitate  their commercial application.  For example, "the law
provides for presidential  awards, tax/duty  exemptions, loan assistance and
invention assistance  development  in prototyping, piloting, training,  study tours,
attendance to conferences/seminars,  and laboratory tests and analyses.  Various
councils of the DOST provide counterpart R&D funds for private  companies.
Although respondents agreed that tax exemption for R&D equipment was con-
ducive to their R&D initiatives,  interviewees found the "procedures too cum-
bersome."  Similarly,  they found the "availment procedures  and equity require-
ments for technology-commercialization loans cumbersome and too steep for
small entrepreneurs."  In fact, producers of organic fertilizers  bewail the data
required  for Fertilizer  and Pesticide Authority  registration.
In general, Patalinghug (1998)  argues that small and medium enterprises
face several problems to acquire technology  or to engage  in R&D. Among these
problems are (1) lack of funds;  (2) insufficient  information;  (3) lack of skills
in evaluating alternative  technologies; (4) lack of technical know-how to shift
to more advanced  technologies; (5)  inadequate mechanism for transfer of tech-
nologies; and (6) inertia  of entrepreneurs because of no perceived or actual
need for technology.
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Education
The Philippines  ranks  low in terms of the number of R&D personnel. In
1992 the ratio  of the number of scientists and engineers per million  popula-
tion was 152. From the  supply side, this  low level of S&T and R&D person-
nel is a result of the country's educational system  that produces  very few science
and engineering graduates. While the number of students at the tertiary  level
is high in the Philippines, students taking up science  and engineering courses
are few. A big policy problem confronting the present educational system is
educational "mismatch"-while  there is a great demand for technical and en-
gineering graduates by local industries,  private  tertiary  schools continue to
produce nontechnical graduates. One of the factors that explains this is that
private  schools prefer not to go into these technical related courses because
of their  high laboratory requirement,  which is capital-intensive.  Nontechni-
cal courses, on the  other hand, are less laboratory-intensive  and therefore
less capital-intensive.
The  pool of R&D  manpower is dominated  by people with  basic college
degrees but generally have very limited  advanced technical training.  This in
itself presents a big stumbling  block because  the new technologies available
are already in advanced state and require  special technical skills.  Thus, the
inadequate R&D manpower places the country in a very disadvantaged posi-
tion because it does not have enough technical capability  to adopt, through
R&D, developed  technologies in the market.  In other words, with inadequate
technological capability,  the Philippines  may find  it  difficult  to catch up in
terms of access  to and mastery  of the key emerging  or leading-edge  technologies.
This, in turn,  will  negatively affect its future  growth and international  com-
petitiveness.
A recent survey conducted by PillS  (Cororaton et Ill.  2000) on the R&D
activities  of government agencies and SUCs found  that  more than  30 per-
cent of R&D  personnel with  Ph.D. degrees are in social sciences while  only
less than  5 percent are in engineering and technology (Figures  18 and 19).
About 15 percent are in agriculture-related  sectors.
This inadequate supply of R&D manpower can be traced back to the poor
state of basic education in the country. This problem is rooted in the teacher
training  policy of the country and the public  perception of the teaching pro-
fession  (Magpantay  1995).  He says,  "To be able to teach in high schools,  teachers
must have a Bachelor of Science in Education (BSE) with  a major and minor
field. This degree program is short in content and heavy in methodology. In
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the end, teachers are knowledgeable in the standard  way of,teaching but do
not know what to teach." Worse, he adds, because of the  low regard for the
teaching profession, it tends to  attract  only students who are generally re-
garded as uncreative and unimaginative.  In any family, the intelligent  among
the children are encouraged  to take up medicine, law, and, if mathematically
inclined,  engineering while the least academically capable are asked to take
up BSE or BSEE (Bachelor of Science in Elementary  Education) programs.
"It  is no wonder then," he says, "that the science and math education in the
primary  and secondary levels is in bad shape." Students are taught  by the
least academically inclined people who went through a program that empha-
sizes more on the form than on the content."
The poor S&T educational system results  in low supply of skilled  man-
power (Sachs  1988). "In particular, there is a severe  shortage of science  teachers
at the school  level. The quality  of science  education at the college level is also
poor. A substantial  fraction of high school science  teachers have no training
in science  and mathematics (but rather have degrees  in education). High school
math and physics curricula are badly in need of reform. A World Bank-funded
engineering  and science  education  project  has provided scholarships  for master's
and doctoral training  in science  and engineering, but the scope  of the project
is limited.  In general, there is a lack of capacity to do research, which  will
become particularly  problematic  in the future  when forms will  have greater
demand for adopting and innovating existing technologies.  Increasing  the supply
of science and technology education is probably the most crucial  investment
in science  and technology that needs  to be made now."
Health
The present study did not have the opportunity  to include  an analysis of
the  health  sector R&D.  However, the  Center for Economic Policy Research
(CEPR), through funding from the Department of Health (DOH), recently con-
ducted an analysis  of the funds  flow into  health  research and development
in the Philippines.  Among the  major objectives of the analysis were to:  (a)
trace the flow of health R&D resources;  (b) assess  the system for setting health
R&D priorities;  and (c) determine  if health R&D funds  match the priorities
of the research agenda.
Some of the major insights  derived from the CEPR-DOHfindings,  which
are relevant to the R&D gaps analysis in this  section are as follows:
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(a)  Of the P394 billion  government budget for 1996, health resources ac-
counted for P75 billion or 19 percent, while R&D resources  had a mea-
ger share of P3 billion,  or less than 1 percent.
(b)  Resources  for health R&D amounted to  P421 million, which was equiva-
lent to 17 percent of R&D resources  and 1 percent of health resources.
The latter is below 2 percent of the national health expenditures, the
proportion recommended  by the Commission  for Health Research  and
Development (CHRD) for health R&D.
Other  Important  Gaps
In his study of the long history of S&T and R&D in the Philippines,  Eclar
(1991) says its  beginnings  can be traced back to the American  colonial pe-
riod. Significant  changes have since transpired,  including those in the struc-
ture,  system, leadership, and administration.  Recently, programs and plans
were launched like the Science  and Technology Master Plan (STMP) in 1990
and the Science  and Technology  Agenda for National  Development (STAND)
in 1993. However, no successes  can be cited yet, only failures  (patalinghug
1998). For example, the  S&T sector faces the following  major problems: (a)
underutilization  of S&T for development, as reflected in the low quality  and
productivity  of the  production  sector and heavy dependence on imports;  (b)
underinvestment  in S&T developments in terms of manpower training,  tech-
nological services, R&D facilities,  and financial  resources; (c) weak linkages
between technology generation, adaptation, and utilization;  and (d) slow com-
mercialization  of technologies because  of a very weak delivery system, which
in turn is the result of weak linkages especially between government research
institutes  and end-users.
Patalinghug (1998)  adds that "there has been  a general  failure to use tech,-
nology to gain competitive  advantage. Resource-based  exports (e.g., timber,
copper) are basically in raw material  or unprocessed  form. Traditional  agri-
cultural  exports (coconut, sugar, and banana) are also exported without  in-
fusing technology-based processing in the value-added chain. The shift  from
primary  exports (coconut, sugar) to manufactured  exports (garments, elec-
tronics)  simply reflects the  changing factor composition of exports  (that  is,
.from being resource-intensive  to labor-intensive). The shift from labor-intensive
to skills-  or technology-intensive manufactured exports has not yet occurred."
Institutional  weaknesses.  A number of institutional  gaps clearly exist. Some
of these include:
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(a)  Failure in execution  and implementation. Patalinghug (1998)  compares
the S&T system in the Philippines and in South Korea. He says, "Ba-
sically,  in form and intent,  the Philippine  S&T development plan is
comparable to that of Korea. Thus, the basic weakness of the Philip-
pine experience  is in its execution  and implementation. Although there
are some weaknesses in the plan formulation  in the Philippines,  be-
cause the planning exercise is detached from the budgeting exercise,
the more decisive factor is the weakness and organization  arrange-
ment to ensure timely and correct implementation."
The existing  intragovernment  coordination system suffers from ma-
jor flaws.  In particular,  the  system of performance monitoring  and
evaluation is lacking or defective. "In fact, the government's Invest-
ment Coordination Committee (ICC), which is chaired by NEDA, has
been  lengthily reviewing projects intended to address  the adverse effect
of the financial  crisis.  But based on the ICC's inefficiency  in evalu-
ating  development projects, these projects are more likely  to be ap-
proved when the economic conditions  they are supposed to address
are no longer there. The ideal institutional  arrangement is definitely
to  establish a coordination  mechanism between the  S&T plan,  the
budget plan,  and the  Medium-Term  Philippine  Development Plan
(MTPDP). Unfortunately,  the prospects of establishing  this  linkage
in the Philippine  bureaucracy, in the short run, are not promising."
(b)  Other causes  of institutional  failure.  Some  argue that the Korean gov-
ernment  has the  political  will  and the consensus among its  stake-
holders to give top priority  to S&T development in the  allocation  of
resources.  Magpantay (1995),  on the other hand, claims that the DOST
is a highly  inefficient  structure  largely because it "is doing too many
S&T activities,  charged with too many functions,  operating in a bu-
reaucracy with  too many constraints,  and given too little  support."
This is manifested in the DOST-STMP 15 leading edges  and STAND
22 R&D priority  areas. These areas are all-inclusive  and practically
cover all industries  and all technologies with  too little  financial  re-
sources. This is a clear example of poor planning  and poor budget-
ing. Patalinghug  (1998) concludes that "the most reasonable conclu-
sion that can be made is that both STMP and STAND cannot  be imple-
mented. Their defects arose from the following factors: (1) budgeting
and planning  were not harmonized in the  drafting  of the S&T plan;
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(2) the capabilities  of implementing  agencies  were ignored; (3) solid
support from various stakeholders was lacking; and therefore  (4) re-
sources for  S&T development were insufficient.  By any standards,
the amount actually used for R&D in the DOST budget is absolutely
too little."
(c)  Failure  of industrial  policy. There are renewed attempts  to formu-
late  industrial  policy (patalinghug  1998). This is a reiteration  of the
vital  role of industrial  progress to sustain future  economic growth in
the country.  "However, ad hoc or de facto industrial  policies (as for-
mulated  by the Export Development Council, Industry  Development
Council, and Small and Medium Enterprises  Development Council)
have not stressed the need for active promotion of technology to build
a strong foundation for industrialization."  The STAND has identified
what  is  called  "export  winners"  or  "industry/product  winners."
Patalinghug  argues that  identifying  these winners  without  technol-
ogy is like  running  a vehicle without  an engine.
There are at least 12 priority  sectors that have been implicitly  identified
in the recent pole-vaulting  strategy. However, the technologies in support of
these "must-do" programs have yet to be identified.
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Policy  Lessons  for  the  Philippines
This paper lays out at the outset that:  (a) a productivity-based growth is ~ore
sustainable  in the  long run  than a factor accu~ulation-based  growth;  (b) a
growth strategy that is consistent with productivity-based  growth is techno- .
logical innovation-based; and (c) in developing countries where institutional
rigidities  as well as ~arket  i~perfections  are prevalent,  technological inno-
vation-based  growth strategy  is extre~ely difficult to imple~ent. The impressive
growth of the Japanese econo~y after World War II was generally a produc-
tivity-based growth achieved  through a technological  innovation-based  strategy.
Technological innovation,  as discussed in Section I, involves a dynamic proc-
ess. At each  step  of the process,  economic  growth improves,  as Japan has shown.
The experience of Japan therefore provides useful policy lessons for develop-
ing countries like the Philippines,  which are struggling to grow. It was against
this  backdrop that the paper was conceptualized.
The paper attempted to review the growth process in Japan after WWII.
It  then analyzed the  initial  conditions, the economic environment  in which
the economy  was operating, the goals and strategies pursued, the institutions
established, the economic  policies implemented, the programs developed,  the
role of government in the entire process, and the involvement  of the private
sector. Since the  main objective was to  draw policy lessons for the Philip-
pines, the paper analyzed in great detail the local S&T experiences for pur-
poses  of comparison.
The analysis of the experience of Japan yielded the following lessons: (1)
accumulation  of technological experience is extremely important,  which,  in
the case of Japan, was started years before World  War II broke out through
its  prewar industrialization  policies; (2) key institutions,  which proved to be
very crucial  in the process, were established (like the Science and Technol-
ogy Agency, research institutions,  labor unions,  patent office, etc.); (3) the
industrial  strategy pursued was seen as managing the process  of technologi-
110"  Policy  Lessons  for  the  Philippines
cal change to achieve a dynamic  industrialization  (as was quite  evident in
the phasing in and phasing out of Japan's priority  industries  and the rapid
growth of R&D  during the period when the technological gap with  developed
countries  in Europe and America was closing); (4) importation,  adaptation,
assimilation of foreign technology are important;  (5) incentives and subsidies
are vital  to promoting private  participation,  which in a neoclassical sense  is
inefficient but in reality is effective if granted in a competitive manner through
a set of criteria  laid  out by the government; (6) manpower development can
be achieved through basic and formal education, vocational training,  and com-
pany-sponsored  skills-enhancing programs; (7) sound macroeconomic  manage-
ment and stable economy  are extremely essential to private participation;  (8)
strong leadership ensures political  stability;  and (9) shared development can
be attained  through the rapid  expansion of the middle class.
While Section  II discusses  the foregoing  in detail, it is important to elaborate
further  two important issues that are particularly  relevant to the Philippines:
(a) industrial  strategy; and (b) proper institutional  arrangements.
The  current  debate in the economic literature  puts the issue of indus-
trial  strategy that  is consistent with  the arguments  of Hirshman  (1958) on
the sidelines.  In fact, the issue of the  day is globalization  through  "making
prices right."  While  this  may be justified  by the failures  of some countries
which adopted import  substitution  policies thrt>ugh targeting,  like the Phil-
ippines, Brazil,  and India,  to name a few, "making prices totally  right"  may
be unrealistic,  especially if technological change is at the heart of the growth
strategy.  The market  of technology is highly  imperfect,  while  the economic
environment. within  which these developing  countries are operating is adverse
to technology-based  institutions  because  of the factors outlined  in Section I.
The case in point is the Philippines,  which has been exerting a lot of ef-
fort in implementing economic  reforms that are consistent with globalization.
While the prevailing  set of economic  reforms15  is extremely important to over-
haul the  inefficient  production structure  of the economy, it lacks focus and
provides no clear direction for technological innovation. The recently adopted
S&T plan of the government lists  down 23 industries  as priority  areas. They
are simply  too many, since the  production lines of these industries  are to-
tally unrelated. The case of Japan, and to a great extent South Korea, is very
clear: the technological  innovation strategy was attuned, synchronized  and con-
15  Economic  refomls include  trade  refomls. financial  refomls, fiscal refomls,  exchange  rate  refomls. invetment  refonns
and other market  reforms through privatization and liberalization.
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sistent with the overall industrial  strategy. This is a very important  lesson  for
the Philippines  during this period of economic  reform. The process of techno-
logical innovation  cannot start and gain momentum unless some kind  of an
industrial  strategy is adopted.  Activities in technology  area are simply too risky
and to a great extent capital-intensive.  Unless  clear directions  are set, the private
sector would be hesitant to participate  no matter how attractive  government
incentives are. In the Philippines, incentives have been  made available to R&D-
related activities since the early 1990s,  with very few takers.
The second  issue involves institutional  arrangements. A review of S&T ex-
perience  in the Philippines provides some  clue that key ingredients for a tech-
nology-based growth  strategy  may already be present. While  they may not
be on a par with  Japan; a relatively  long S&T experience, the institutions,
the policies, and, to a limited  extent, the manpower are present.
However, there is an institutional  failure  because  of very weak institu-
tional  arrangements.  Planning  and budgeting exercises are uncoordinated,
resulting  in very poor performance and project failures.  Focus is also lack-
ing, especially in attracting the private sector, through, for example, the com-
mercialization  of some  developed  technologies.
The lessons  discussed  may have some  important implications to the policy
formulation  exercises in the Philippines,  but they are general. Equally rel-
evant are specific policy recommendations, which  must also be considered.
These include  improvements  in  (1) R&D investments;  (2) R&D  manpower;
(3) incentive  system; (4) institutional  arrangements and S&T coordination
mechanism; (5) R&D delivery system; and (6) statistical  information  and
accounting system.
R&D Investments
There  are  convincing  pieces  of  evidence  showing  significant
underinvestment  in R&D  in the Philippines.  This is true  at the national  as
well  as sectoral levels.  For example,  Cororaton  (1999) estimates  a gap in
R&D  expenditure  of 0.5778 percent of GNP at the  national  level. David  et
al.  (1999) also observe significant  underinvestment  in  agriculture.  Israel
(1999) also found the same thing  in the fisheries  sector. Underinvestment
in R&D is also very apparent in the private,  manufacturing  sector, as noted
by Macapanpan  (1998) and Halos (1998). The recently completed study on
the flow of R&D funds  in the health sector by CEPR-DOH (1998) also found
substantial  underinvestment  in R&D.
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There is also an equally convincing set of facts indicating  high rates of
return  on R&D investments. This  being the case, underinvestment  in R&D
and high rates of return may imply high opportunity cost.  While it is extremely
difficult  to compute opportunity  cost  because  of lack of information,  it is none-
theless  evident in  other indicators  like  productivity.  Productivity  perform-
ance in the Philippines  has been very poor. In fact, this  has been the major
factor behind its unsustainable growth path. In principle, R&D activities lead
to innovation,  to technological progress, and finally  to economic growth and
prosperity.  A huge body of literature  supports this.
The biggest issue at hand is: Who would fIll  in the gap? Rough calcula-
tions indicate  that there is a gap of about P14 billion  at current prices. For
sure, the  government sector cannot fill  in this  gap because of financial  con-
straints.  Furthermore,  the government has other equally important  concerns
such as basic infrastructure  and other social sector  needs. Naturally,  it has
to be the private  sector (either  local or foreign) that  should fill  in the gap.
However, the private sector  will only respond  to appropriate incentives. Further
discussion  on this is given later in the section.
Part of the gap can be attributed  to the misallocation of allocation of re-
sources. In fact, in agriculture,  David et al. (1999)  argue that misallocation of
public sector research funding is as important as underinvestment.  They cite
specific examples. Using the congruence  rule, they have found that "relatively
greater research budgets are provided for minor commodities such as cotton,
silk, and carabao, and too little  for major ones such as corn, coconut,  fisheries,
and others. Furthermore, Mindanao regions are relatively neglected in terms
of the research  budgets of the DA and SUCs compared  to the regions in Luzon
and, to a lesser  extent, to those in the Visayas.  While congruency  does  not strictly
coincide with  optimal research  resource  allocation, the differences in research
intensity ratios observed among  commodities and across  regions cannot be ex-
plained by possible differences in cost of research (probability of research suc-
cess,  etc.), future  market potential, or equity considerations."
Another manifestation of misallocation of resources lies in the allocation
of budgetary resources by type  of expenditure.  David  et al.  (1999) observe
that  "too little  resources are available to perform research activities  and to
properly maintain  the physical facilities,  after the salaries of personnel have
been paid. The average share of personal services to direct budgetary out-
lays is close  to 60 percent and goes  as high as 70 to 80 percent in many cases.
Consequently, either the research manpower is underutilized  or the research
agenda is driven by donors' priorities."
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Due to lack of information arising out of extremely poor databases  on R&D
activities,  misallocation of research resources in other sectors like the manu-
facturing  cannot be conducted. However, given the nature and extent of prob-
lems in the R&D  system in the Philippines,  the issues affecting agriculture
seem generic to all sectors of the economy.
Aside from underinvestment and misallocation of research  resources,  there
is another big problem of untimely release of funds to institutions,  programs,
and projects. In fact, this is true  not only in R&D but also in other activities
that are dependent upon government funding and support. Israel (1999)  men-
tions this  as one of the  major concerns in the fisheries sector. "In fisheries,
it is acute because of the importance  that time  and season play in the con-
duct of activities.  Although  there are no data which can be used to validate
this, research  activitie~ are reported to be cancelled or haphazardly conducted
because  of the delay in the release of funds," he says. Patalinghug (1998) has
recommended that DBM be involved with  DOST in the S&T and R&D plan-
ning formulati{)n  stage so that  the needed resources are made available  to
implement  such plans without  delay. This issue will  also be addressed later
in the discussion on institutional  arrangement.
R&DManpower
The  issues  surrounding  R&D  manpower  are  equally  problematic  as,  if
not  more  problematic  than,  the  foregoing.  This  is  because  the  problems  in
this  area  can be traced  back to the  educational  system,  which  is  not  only  dif-
ficult  to  reform  but  would  also  take  long  before  reforms  can be  successfully
implemented.  Lag  time  could  take  about  15 to' 20 years-the  required  time
to  properly  educate  and  equip  the  children  with  the  necessary  skills  and tal.
ents  before  they  can enter  the  workforce.
Cororaton  (1998) estimates  that  the  gap in the  R&D  manpower  is  about
197 scientists  and  engineers  per  million  population.  In  agriculture,  David  et
al.  (1998)  observe  that  the  gap in R&D  manpower  is  not so much  in terms  of
number  as in the  relatively  low  level  of scientific  qualification  of agriculture
researchers.  They  warned  that  there  is  an urgent  need to  strengthen  man.
power  capability  in  DA and  DENR  research  agencies.  Israel  (1999)  also ob-
serves  a severe  shortage  of qualified  personnel  in  the  fisheries  sector.  The
same is true  in the private  manufacturing  sector (Macapanpan  1998 and Halos
1998).  In fact,  a PillS  survey  (Cororaton  et al.  2000) found  that  the  majority
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of R&D personnel  have only basic college  degrees.  A small percentage  has doc-
toral degrees,  which are mostly  jn social  sciences.  A very tiny percentage  of Ph.D.
holders are in engi'Ileering  and technology.
While the Philippine  educational system  produces  one of the biggest num-
bers of college graduates compared  to other countries, it generates one of the
smallest numbers of graduates with science  and engineering skills  (Cororaton
1999). There are a host of factors behind this. One of these is the educational
"mismatch" at the tertiary  level-while  there is a great demand for technical
and engineering-related graduates by local industries, private  tertiary  schools
continue to produce  nontechnical  graduates.  One of the factors that explains this
is that private schools,  which dominate  the tertiary level,  prefer  not to offer  technical
courses  because  of their high laboratory requirement, which is capital-intensive.
Non-technical courses  are less laboratory-intensive and therefore less capital-
intensive.
At the secondary  or high school  level, a substantial fraction of high school
science  teachers  have no formal training in science  and mathematics (Magpantay
1995 and Sachs et al. .1998),  only degrees  in education. There is, therefore, an
urgent need to reform high school  math and physics  curricula. This problem also
holds true at the primary level.
In almost all sectors,  the lack of adequate manpower surfaces  out. To sus-
tain a long-term growth, the country urgently needs  to reform the science  and
technology  education  system. In fact, investment in science  and technology  edu-
cation is the most crucial investment that can  be made now (Sachs  et al. 1998).
Otherwise, it would be too late since returns to this  investment have usually
very long gestation  period or time lag.
Patalinghug (1998)  offers  specific  recommendations:  (1) Strengthen  S&T edu-
cation at the elementary and secondary  levels. The quantity and quality of el-
ementary and secondary  te~chers  of science  and mathematics must be addressed
in the MTPDP: 1999-2004;  (2) Implement a strong science  and engineering  pro-
gram to support an expansion  of science  and engineering enrollment at the ter-
tiary level. Related to this is the need  to expand the facilities of science  and en-
gineering institutions and encourage  the hiring of qualified faculty from abroad;
(3) Intensify the effective recruitment of Filipino scientists and engineers  work-
ing abroad by designing an incentive program that matches  the cost  of the Edu-
cation and Science Education  Project;16 and (4) Expand the Philippine  Sci-
ence High School  system.
'8 South KQrea  did this in the early 1960s with great  success.
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Incentive  System
People, especially  the private sector,  respond  to incentives. Incentives that
are deemed  particularly important to R&D activities include: (1)  stable economy;
(2) institutional  protection;  (3) access  to capital and financing,  especially by
the SMEs; (4) good  R&D infrastructure;  and (5) fiscal incentives.
Normally,  there are high risks  involved  in R&D activities,  particularly
uncertainties  in the outcome of an R&D undertaking.  Favorable results  of
an R&D  undertaking  will  not emerge 100 percent or with  certainty.  In fact,
the possibility  of failure  is great. Furthermore,  there is the high incidence of
spillover  or externality  that  is hard  to appropriate.  In this  regard, govern-
ment intervention  is critically  needed.
Ample literature  and empirical evidence support the  fact that  a stable
macroeconomy  helps encourage  productivity-enhancing activities like R&D, es-
pecially by the private sector.  Therefore, conducive macroeconomy  is one of the
major incentives that  can be offered to private investors. The role of the gov-
ernment is particularly  important  in managing the economy  so that  inflation
rate, interest rates, risk premiums and etc. are kept at the minimum.
There are also clear indications from the literature  that institutional  pro-
tection is critically  needed. Institutional  protection comes  in the form of pat-
ents and intellectual  property rights.  These issues have not been addressed
in detail in the present paper, but certainly there are problem areas that need
to be ironed  out here. To be sure, there are indications  that  the  number of
patents granted have declined through time.
Macapanpan  (1998),  Halos (1998)  and Nolasco  (1998)  have observed  through
company interviews  and surveys that one of the major constraints  prevent-
ing some of the firms,  especially the SMEs, from conducting and pursuing
R&D  activities  and plans is the  lack of access  to cheap capital  and financ-
ing. The cost of capital in the Philippines  is traditionally  high because  of dis-
tortions  in the financial  system.
R&D and S&T infrastructure  is also one crucial incentive  that could at-
tract the private  sector to pursue technology-related activities.  Appropriate
infrastructure  could come in the form of (1) a strengthened educational sys-
tem which can produce a workforce with  adequate R&D capabilities,  as well
as reliable and updated databases  and information system; (2) wide and easy-
to-access network  on technology developments; (3) a mechanism to  attract
Filipino  scientists and engineers to come  home; and (4) a mechanism whereby
research results  and output  'jf research institutions  and universities  can be
delivered to the end-users, among others.
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Macapanpan (1998), Halos (1998) and Nolasco (1998) also note that fis-
cal incentives are important  in attracting  the private  sector to go into R&D
activities.  Cororaton (1999) lists  down some  of the major fiscal incentives  in
the Philippines,  and finds  that these were generally  similar  to the ones of-
fered in other countries. However, fiscal incentives have to be handled prop-
erly,  as these would have significant  budgetary implications.  Furthermore,
although  fiscal incentives  are important,  results  would indicate  that  there
are major inefficiencies  in the  granting  of incentives by the BOI.  For exam-
ple, Nolasco (1998) notes that  from 1991 to 1997, only 11 companies or a to-
tal of 13 projects, received incentives. Patalinghug  (1998) therefore suggests
the need to "design an incentive package, with  strict  qualifying requirements
on what constitutes R&D activities,  to encourage  private  sector  R&D.  An ex-
ternal  peer review committee is recommended  to act as the screening mecha-
nism." The granting  of fiscal incentives  may be conducted on a competitive
basis through  a set of performance criteria  that  may be defined by the gov-
ernment.
Israel (1999) discusses other important  incentive issues that need atten-
tion.  In particular,  it was noted that  in most cases, researchers conducting
research using the funds  from their  own agencies are accorded minimal  fi-
nancial incentives. Remunerations from projects funded by other government
sources have been low. As a result,  many researchers tend to do odd jobs not
related to research, or consulting work for private  and international  organi-
zations. The results of the PillS  survey on R&D manpower, particularly  those
involving  R&D  personnel with  Ph.D. degrees, point to this trend  (Cororaton
et al. 2000).
The Magna Carta  for the  Government Science and Technology Person-
nel (Republic Act  8439) was recently passed to address the  problem of low
incentives,  but it remains to be seen whether this  will  solve the problem. In
particular,  the  law allows for the provision of honoraria,  share of royalties,
hazard allowance and other benefits to science  and technology workers.
Patalinghug  (1998) offers additional recommendations that  can improve
the S&T incentives. These include (1) allocation of an annual funding for the
implementation  of the Scientific  Career System (SCS). However, entry into
SCS should be limited  by giving  top priority  to the  target  groups, natural
scientists  and engineers; and  (2) the  implementation  of a competitive  bid-
ding, strictly  based on merit,  in the awarding of research projects by pooling
a major portion of the country's R&D resources  to be administered by an agency
similar  to the National  Science Foundation  (NSF).
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Institutional  Arrangement  and  S&T  Coordination  Mechanism
From all indications, the entire R&D system, as well as the general S&T
system, is in a state of disarray because  of lack of leadership, direction,  and
coordination. There are systems, as well as administrative  failures,  that re-
sult in wrong implementation of the plans, projects, and programs. There are
also policy failures  due to the lack of focus on technology in the  overall de-
velopment strategy.  To address these problems, Patalinghug  (1998) recom-
mends the  following  reforms:  (a) DBM must be involved  with  DOST in the
S&T plan  formulation  stage so that  S&T resources are available  to imple-
ment the plan;  (b) STCC must draft  a Medium-Term Science and Technol-
ogy Development Plan a year before  the drafting by NEDA of the next MTPDP.
An inter-agency joint  committee  must integrate  the Medium  Term Science
and Technology  Development Plan into the MTPDP by decomposing  them into
an annual  budget plan,  annual  S&T plan,  and annual economic plan,  and
then harmonizing  its goals, projects, programs, strategies, resource require-
ments, and timetables;  (c) DOST must establish a project and program moni-
toring  unit  staffed by at most three persons whose main job is to coordinate
the selection, through competitive bidding, of external evaluators and reviewers
for the  different  projects and programs impiemented  under the S & T plan;
and (d) an STCC chaired by the President must meet at least once every three
months to address current problems that pose obstacles to the implementa-
tion of the  S&T plan. An MOT unit  attached to DOST (just like  PillS  is at-
tached to NEDA) will  act as the technical  secretariat of STCC under the di-
rect supervision of the DOST Secretary.
R&D Delivery  System
Eclar (1991) notes the very slow commercialization of technologies in the
Philippines.  This  is largely  due to the  very weak delivery  system and poor
linkages of S&T organizations with  industry  and other government agencies.
To improve the linkages  Patalinghug  (1998) has a number of recommenda-
tions:
(1)  Reorganize the government-supported R & D institutes  into  a new
corporate structure  that gives them flexibility  as well as responsibil-
ity to gradually  develop  its fiscal autonomy.
(2)  Establish  funding  schemes through  DOST and the  Commission on
Higher Education (CHED) to support  a consortium  or network of schools
to maximize the use of resources.
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(3)  Focus funding support for developing core competence  in targeted re-
gional universities.  For instance, the  University  of San Carlos can
specialize in  chemistry  and chemic,al  engineering;  MSU-IIT  in me-
chanical engineering; and Xavier University  in biochemistry and ag-
ricultural  engineering.
(4)  Promote S&T culture  by giving  presidential  awards to outstanding
science  and engineering projects selected through a nationwide com-
petitive  search. Encourage science-oriented TV and radio programs,
fairs,  plant tours, and apprenticeships.
(5)  Install a scanning and monitoring scheme  of world technological  trends
for dissemination to local inqustries,  research institutes,  and univer-
sities.
Eclar (1991)  conducted a comprehensive  analysis of factors affecting COttl-
mercialization  of technologies. Her study identified  user participation.  Suc-
cessful commercialization  is promoted when a user with  a specific need has
been identified  at the  start  of the project. The user generally maintains  an
interest  in the progress of the research and takes on the commercialization
of the results  at the completion of the research project to meet his previously
identified  need. This is reinforced  when the user's interest  in the  project is
translated  into  support or cost sharing.
Another important  factor is pilot testing.  Demonstration of the technical
viability  of the technology in a semi-commercial scale helps convince an in-
dustry  user to  start off the  commercialization  process. Commercial success,
is ensured when the  user himself has provided  material  inputs  to the  pilot
test.
Statistical  Information  and  A-ecounting  System
Good  and accurate  analysis of R&D opportunities is one of the major factors
that  would  help encourage private,  as well as public,  investment  into  R&D
and S&T-related  activities.  This  is because, normally,  there are high risks
involved  in R&D  investments  (particularly  the  uncertainty  in the outcome
of an R&D undertaking),  coupled with  the high incidence of spillover  or ex-
ternality  that is hard to appropriate.  These uncertainties  and other market
failures  can be minimized  if the statistical  information  and accounting sys-
tem is well established. A good information  system leads to good analysis of
the structure  and nature  of R&D  activities.  If  there are significant  market
failures,  with  good analysis,  then appropriate  and correct policy measures
119Technological  Innovation in Japan and  S&T Experiences  in the  Philippines
can easily be formulated to correct these market kinks. However, the present
statistical  information  and accounting system is extremely poor. It generates
very inaccurate  information  on the variables of particular  interest  in policy.
This  assessment is based on the  recent R&D  survey conducted  by PillS
(Cororaton et al. 2000). Thus, there is an urgent need to overhaul the statis-
tical information and accounting system on R&D and S&T activities. The first
major step involves making the survey questionnaire consistent with the ac-
counting system of the institutions  so that information  can flow immediately
from the information  system of the respective institutions  into the R&D da-
tabase. The next major step involves reconciling the variables  in the ques-
tionnaire  consistent with  the NSO-PSIC sectoral breakdown. The third  rec-
ommendation is to institutionalize  the data  system in NSO, because of its
expertise in gathering information  and its extensive nationwide  network.  By
doing  so, regular information is generated  and regular monitoring and analysis
are conducted.
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